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ABSTRACT 
Changes in the organization, funding and delivery of health care are affecting health sj'stems in all 
societies in the search for greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The issue of quality is at the 
forefront of these changes and has been largely addressed by the implementation of the Medical Audit 
initiative. Medical Audit is the review of clinical practice, a process largely designed by doctors, led by 
doctors and, described as an issue that is essentially a matter for the medical profession. Nevertheless, 
since its formal introduction, the initiative has largely failed to meet expectations. Some argue that the 
problem is technical in character, that audit methods are inadequately researched. Others believe that the 
philosophy of Total Quality Management, designed to effect continuous improvement in all aspects of 
health service delivery, is more appropriate. 
However, this study, conducted through participation and observation of both the audit process 
and implementation of Total Quality Management in health care, will argue that, in their current form, 
neither is adequate for fulfilling its stated objectives. It will suggest that Medical Audit is conceptually 
rather than technically inadequate, because little account is taken of the complex social and technical 
systems that exist within hospital settings. Similarly, the industrial model of 'total quality' presupposes 
conditions that do not exist within provider organizations. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Medical 
Audit and Total Quality Management are inappropriate for health care. Audit has demonstrated only 
limited success and, though many of aspects of the 'total quality' approach are clearly relevant, it will 
require modification and further testing prior to full implementation. Both audit and 'total qualit}'' 
require fundamental changes in behaviour, and if they fail, they may not get a second chance - health care 
quality is much to important for that to be allowed to happen. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the publication of the White Paper Working for Patients (DoH, 1989a), the British National 
Health Service (NHS) was subject to radical reforms designed to change its system of management and 
organizational structure in pursuit of greater efficiency, accountability and effectiveness. These issues are 
addressed in three key features of the reforms, namely: the introduction of a competitive internal market 
which was established by separating the roles of purchasing and providing health care; the creation of 
independently accountable NHS Trust hospitals; and the introduction of formal mechanisms aimed at 
improving service standards, optimizing the use of resources and enhancing the quality of care. 
The reforms were considered necessary for three main reasons. First, although general 
management had been introduced to the NHS in 1983, and government continued to have primary control 
over NHS funding, neither government nor the NHS management have control over the demand for health 
care or over the technical capacity of the health care system to provide an increasingly wide range of 
diagnostic and therapeutic services. Hence, the associated costs of providing modern health care together 
with the pervasive value-for-money ethos in contemporary economic thought, combined to provide 
powerfirl stimuli for focusing (or re-focusing) political attention on the issue of efficiency uithin the NHS. 
Second, as a result of what Moran and Wood (1993) term the 'state sanctioned self-regulation' of 
medicine, and the continuity of a decentralized system of health service administration, government 
remained largely unable to exercise operational control over the NHS. Moreover, the relative autonomy 
enjoyed by the medical profession at national level was effectively replicated at local level where "...formal 
organisational arrangements [had] been so designed as to leave doctors...free from day to day 
management" (Harrison et al., 1992, p. 23). Thus, in spite of repeated attempts to reform the health care 
system during the 1970s and 1980s, the NHS remained largely unaccountable because "...real power at the 
periphery lay not with the appointed members [of health authorities] but with varying combinations of 
doctors and managers." (Harrison et al.. Op. cit., pp. 132-3) Recent proposals to re-organize Regional 
Health Authorities may sigruficantly alter central-peripheral relationships and while these changes are not 
yet fully implemented their implications will be discussed. 
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Third, government were concerned about inter-regional variation in both the financial and 
operational performance of health care providers. Although a more equitable distribution of resources 
was achieved following the report of the Resource Allocation Working Party (DHSS, 1976), standardized 
performance indicators, introduced following recommendations in the Komer Committee report (DHSS, 
I 
1983), revealed that there were significant differences in terms of the cost and length of stay for similar 
I 
I 
types of in-patient episode. Widespread concern was also expressed about variation in waiting times for 
out-patient appointments and elective surgery, inadequate information systems, the lack of explicit 
i 
standards for patient care, and the general absence of a systematic review of the quality of clinical practice 
(Institute of Health Service Management, 1988). These views were partly endorsed by the medical 
profession who recognized that "...a more systematic evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of doctors' 
work...can now be regarded as an important professional obligation." (Royal College of Physicians, 1989, 
p. 1). : 
I 
I 
The fociis in the health care system had therefore changed from an emphasis on science and 
technology, through cost contaimnent, to a central concern with assessment and accountabilit)'. 
I 
However, the limitations posed by the NHS organization and its internal management structure effectively 
constrained atternpts to improve accountability or increase effectiveness and efficiency. Consequently, a 
principal objective of the 1991 reforms was to alter the balance of power between doctors and managers in 
order to change; the cultural orientation of the health service from reactive administration to proactive 
managerialism (Harrison etal.. Op. cit.; Klein, 1989). 
Three specific but interrelated NHS policy initiatives have the potential to alter the balance of 
power between managers and clinicians and, ipso facto, change the organizational culture. These are 
Medical Audit; Total Quality Management and the Resource Management Initiative (RMI) - the latter 
being a modified version of Management Budgeting implemented following the 1983 Griffiths Report 
I 
(DHSS, 1983; I'DHSS, 1986, HN(86)34). The explicit aim of the RMI is to improve patient care by 
providing doctors and managers with an improved information base upon which to make better 
judgements about their use of resources. By the time the major new reforms were introduced however, it 
had become clear, despite increased participation by clinicians, that the RMI had made littie impact on 
I 
facihtating the desired cultural transformation towards managerialism (Harrison et al., 1992; Packwood et 
al., 1991; Buxton e/a/., 1991). 
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The Medical Audit initiative is, on the other hand, intended to ensure that the review of clinical 
practice against professionally determined standards becomes a formal, systematic and obligatory activity, 
and Unit General Managers have been empowered to include participation in Medical Audit as a feature of 
job descriptions for consultant medical staff (DoH, 1989b; DoH, 1990; DoH, 1989c). Nevertheless, at the 
outset, the precise meaning of Medical Audit was elusive since it was variously described as: a powerful 
mechanism for improving the quality of care; an information system to be integrated with Resource 
Management (RM); an educational process primarily a matter for the medical profession and one that 
should therefore be led by doctors (Dixon, 1990; DHSS Executive Letter, 1989, EL(89)MB/224; Scottish 
Home & Health Dept, 1989 HC(Gen) 29; Standing Committee on Postgraduate Medical Education, 1989). 
I 
Finally, Total Quality Management (TQM) is an American derivative of the concept of Total 
Quality Control developed by Japanese industry and was applied within the NHS in 1989 when the NHS 
Management Executive established seventeen pilot demonsfration projects. TQM is a management 
philosophy which entails conmiitment to the development of internal structures that will ensure 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) throughout an organization. In effect, implementing CQI in 
health care presupposes the creation of an organizational culture that includes a liigh level of employee 
empowerment, biit which may result in the organizational structure being turned upside down (Wilson, 
1992). 
In short, together with the major structural reforms of the health service, the three polic)' 
initiatives outlined above represent 'unprecedented opportunities' for managers to change the culttire of 
NHS and shape the behaviour of its employees (Harrison et al.. Op. cit.). However, these authors argue 
that the new structural context within which the service must fimction will combine with financial issues 
to dominate the managerial agenda, and they question whether senior managers will be prepared, or be 
able, to iitmierse themselves in the "...deep and sensitive waters [of Medical Audit and other quality 
initiatives] when there are so many other issues demanding urgent attention" (Harrison et al.. Ibid., pp. 
131-2). This' question provides a rationale for research and it is partly the purpose of this study to 
investigate the extent to which the Medical Audit, Total Quality Management and Resource Management 
initiatives are conceptually adequate for effecting cultural change within health care provider units. In 
addition, an examination of the Medical Audit and TQM initiatives, including their interaction with RM, 
allows for a technical evaluation of their adequacy for improving the quality of patient care. 
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At the level of technical adequacy, there are three major factors that may constrain the impact of 
Medical Audit. First, the focus on solely medical issues excludes the potential for adverse patient 
outcomes to result from a failine in some other part of the health care system and thus, the integration of 
audit with other qiiality initiatives may be crucial. Second, there is a risk that improven methods may be 
widely adopted and practiced before they can be shown to have a causal relationship with improvements in 
patient care (Crombie et al., 1993). Third, the systematic review of clinical data will not, in itself, result 
in changes in clinical practice (Fowkes et al., 1985). Such change will require the development of 
standards and the' implementation of clinical guidelines which, though implicit in the Medical Audit 
process, will depend on education, and subsequent behavioinal change within the medical profession. 
Similarly, at the level of conceptual adequacy, several factors may inhibit the Medical Audit 
initiative from effecting cultural change either in professional or organizational terms. Medical ethics for 
example, especially the principles of autonomy and confidentiality, are not conducive to improvements in 
the quality of care through formal review (Garrett et al., 1993), Yet, Crombie et al. {Op. cit., p. 7) argue 
that "...complete confidentiality is a cornerstone of modern [medical] audit". What then of 
accountability, and to whom? ff Medical Audit really is a matter 'primarily for the medical profession', 
then doctors will remain clinically accountable solely through the established medical hierarchy. What 
then of cultural change? Doctors may, as Harrison et al. {Op. cit.) have suggested, become obliged to 
assume greater managerial responsibility, but this could be resisted by managers, nurses and otiier healtii-
care professionals tf perceived as a threat to their relative autonomy. In contrast, the Resource 
Management Initiative implies a partnership between clinicians and managers and joint access to pertinent 
clinical and administrative information, yet, given the current definitive characteristics of Medical Audit, 
it is difficult to, perceive how audit activities will feed into the RM process. Finally, effective TQM 
demands an unprecedented level of devolution and delegation to other staff groups, but is an issue tiiat 
may lead to dysfunctional competition for authority jmd responsibility. 
The significance of the above issues was largely identified during the research process, however 
they raise two distinct questions which provide the central focus for this study. First, are tiie Medical 
Audit and TQM initiatives technically adequate for improving tiie quality of patient care? Second, how 
will medical-management relations develop in response to Medical Audit, TQM and structural change; 
will the result represent a genuine cultural shift, or will the statiis quo be maintained? 
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The research methodology was partly determined by the subject matter and partly by the 
occupational status of the author. On the one hand, the focus on policy implementation created a need for 
empirical evidence;about formal and informal structures within the NHS - evidence that does not lend 
i 
itseff readily to the type of quantitative research favoured by policy makers or planners (Booth, 1988; 
Bryman, 1989; Pollitt, et al., 1990). On the other hand, the author enjoyed total participant proximity to 
the topics under investigation and to health care provider units within which they were being 
implemented. Am ethnographic approach was thus considered the most appropriate research tool. 
I 
I 
The relevjant level of analysis and locus for the study were less easily determined. Traditionally, 
medical sociology has tended to be studied at one of two ex-tremes, viz, wide ranging macro level studies 
such as the Black Report into health inequalities (DHSS, 1980), or micro level studies into doctor-patient 
relationships for example. There has been little qualitative research on the impact of policy 
implementation at the meso or intermediate level "...where policy and organizational and managerial 
processes tend to be concentrated" (Hunter, 1990, p. 215). However, at the outset of the study. Working 
for Patients had been under considerable debate for little over one year and the major interest groups had 
identffied their particular areas of concern. Consequently, there was a broad national consensus within 
though not necessarily between these groups about issues relating to the new policy initiatives (RCP, 1989; 
BMA, 1989; Healthcare Independent, 1990; Shaw, 1990). Moreover, strategies for the implementaUon of 
Medical Audit, TQM and RM were largely directed from the centre, accommodating or avoiding identified 
areas of concern, and were supported by 'ring-fenced' central funding. It was considered feasible 
therefore, to conduct a meso level analysis of the impact of central policy within the relative confines of a 
Regional (Northern) Health Authority area. In addition, an unexpected opportunity to develop US qualit>' 
improvement systems in hospitals in the Middle East enabled the author to gain experience of the 
advanced application of TQM and CQI in health care settings. It should be noted however, that materials 
gained during this latter part of the research were limited for use in conducttng an assessment of the 
adaptability of US designs to the NHS environment. A direct comparison of the implementation process 
was not considered feasible due to the distinct administrative and environmental contexts of health care 
provision in the Middle East. It has been argued however, that because of the relative infancy of health 
care quality improvement in the UK, and since we have not yet developed our own terminolog}', we must 
adopt the US vernacular (Samuel, 1991). A technical assessment was thus considered feasible, timely and 
relevant. ,' 
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Finally, it should be clear from the central questions that the research seeks to answer, that the 
research aims to provide elements of description, interpretation, analysis and explanation. The first of 
these is largely a technical issue facilitated partly by a comprehensive review of secondary literature and 
through participation in local, national and international seminars and training courses. The 
interpretation and analysis of findings are necessarily conducted within, and limited by, the chosen 
methodology. The final element is however, constrained by the author's theoretical position and 
conceptual framework from which the NHS organization is examined and both are outiined below. 
Organizational culture is a vague concept which is difficult to define, but is often ex-plained from 
one of four perspectives broadly classified as Classical, Human Relations, Systems and Contingency 
approaches (Mullins, 1993; Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991). The classical approach has sought to locate 
definitions and explanations in terms of management hierarchies and formal organizations in which 
reality is to be foimd in "...an inert amalgam of facts waiting to be umavelled by an investigator" (Brjman, 
Op. cit., p. 141). Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how tiie NHS could function witiiout exhibiting some 
classical bureaucratic characteristics since the various health care professions function in a continuous 
state of flux as they absorb the impact of new policy initiatives, science and technology witiiin an 
environment that readily admits change, but demands a measure of regularity and imiformity to ensure 
continuity. The classical approach accommodates these feahires of organizations, but fails to account for 
the concepts of power and status and has been described as "...an outmoded, narrowly Weberian, and 
apolitical rational-legal-institutional model of organization." (Hunter, Op. cit., p. 220) 
The human relations approach on the other hand, gained much impetus following the Hawthorne 
experiments conducted in the USA during the 1920s. Here, the organization is regarded as a 
predominantly social system within which behaviour and group membership are key concepts. Emphasis 
is placed on the importance of informal structures in determining the construction and maintenance of 
organizational culture and the approach has demonstrated that organizations do not merely fulfil an 
economic function, but provide their members but with a variety of social needs (Maslow, 1943). The 
approach can nevertheless, be criticised for failing to account for the impact of environmental factors. In 
contrast, a systems approach accounts for the impact of some environmental influences by focusing on 
interrelationships between the various systems found within an organization (Huczj-nski and Buchanan, 
Op. cit.). 
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From a systems perspective the manner in which an organization functions can best be 
understood by examining the interaction between its social and technical systems (Trist and Bamforth, 
1951). The technical system includes equipment, physical location and supply of materials while the 
social system is designed to meet the socio-psychological needs of employees, establish the boundaries of 
work relationships, develop communications systems and staff fraining progranunes for example. 
Advocates of the approach argue that organizational design is open to choice and depends on decisions 
about the way in which technology will be used to achieve corporate and employee goals. Hence, an 
analysis of the resultant socio-technical system is said to provide an explanation of how and why an 
organization functions in a particular way. Nevertheless, there are two major objections to adopting a 
basic systems approach when considering the NHS. First, the approach presupposes that decision makers 
identify and act in accord with the significant constituent parts of each system - a scenario that is not 
consistent with the frequent difficulties encountered in the NHS when attempts are made to achieve central 
policy objectives at local level. Second, cenfral policy is external to the technical system that exists at the 
intermediate level of the health service and is, by definition, part of a third 'political' system within which 
the service must function. A systems approach would thus divorce the NHS from its environment and pay 
"...scant regard...to the actual setting in which managers have to operate." (Hunter, Op. cit., p. 230) 
Alternatively, the contingency approach, developed from systems theory, considers the design of 
an organization to be dependent on the complexity and variability of its environment (Burns and Stalker, 
1961). These authors argue that, in unstable or changing circumstances, the 'mechanistic' structure 
becomes untenable, and that a flexible 'organismic' structure is appropriate. Characteristics of the 
organismic organization contrast sharply with those found in a rational bureaucrac)' and include 
multidisciplinary participation, shared responsibilify and lateral conununication (Burns, 1963). In brief, a 
contingency approach attempts to understand relationships by examining the interaction between the 
mechanical and organic components of an organization, though in doin^ so it tends to raise more 
questions than it provides answers for. Nevertheless, it is considered an appropriate conceptual approach 
because a major issue for NHS managers in the post-1989 era "...is to decide which organizational 
components might best be organized along bureaucratic, mechanistic lines and which might best be 
organized in...more flexible, organic lines." (Hunter, Op. cit., p. 231) This does not entail a complete 
rejection of the alternative approaches, but is to regard them as too narrow to accommodate the 
complexities of the reformed NHS. 
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The focus oh specific policy issues, together with the central concept of organizational culture 
and the recognition of the importance of external environmental influences on the NHS, all value-
influenced choices or judgements made by the author, were the major factors in establishing the theoretical 
orientation of the research. A review of the literatine reveals that political theory predominates in tiie 
study of policy issues whether considered at the level of initiation, formulation or implementation where 
organizational cultiire is a key concept (Klein, 1989; Harrison et al., 1990; Harrison et al., 1992; Ham, 
1992). Similarly, though perhaps inevitably, discussions about the environmental contexl of the NHS 
have given significant attention to the political and economic objectives of many recent changes (Levitt 
and Wall, 1992; Ham, 1991). Finally, where specific health care sub-cultures or the social context of 
health care have been examined, a political dimension, though perhaps not central, is nevertheless 
acknowledged (Freidson, 1988; Jones, R. 1994). 
In addition, during the initial phases of tiie research process, although the concept of power was 
rarely explicitiy acknowledged by NHS members, it was clearly exercised in a variety' of gtiises. 
Furthermore, the concept of authority was similarly evident in all three of its Weberian forms (see Albrow, 
1970). Finally, many observations sigmfied the importance of status as a key concept in explaining 
behaviour within NHS health care organizations. Hence, at the outset there were sufficient grounds, 
reinforced by observation and by subsequent literature, for accepting the theory that the NHS was 
essentially a political organization in which the concepts of power, status and authoritj', though not 
particularly original, were important facets of an organizational cultiu-e that was perceived by 
organizational members to be in tiie process of radical ti-ansformation. The structtne of the remainder of 
the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the development of Medical Audit in the UK, including a general 
historical summary and a discussion about its theoretical and metiiodological bases. 
Chapter Three contains a conceptual framework for understanding the philosophy of Total Quality 
Management, but also discusses the issues and techniques employed in Continuous Quality Improvement 
programmes. 
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Chapter Four considers the macro-level environmental context of the NHS and discusses its impUcations 
for the meso-level organization of health care provider units. 
Chapter Five outlines the research methodology. 
Chapter Six describes the meso-level environment of hospital provider units as it has developed in 
response to some of the issues identified in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Seven focuses on social relations within health care provider units and is cenfrally concerned 
with the question of the conceptual adequacy of new qualify initiatives. Based almost entirely on 
observed behaviour within provider units, it nevertheless includes elements of analysis in an attempt to 
derive meaning from this complex social environment. 
Chapter Eight provides and evaluation of the potential for applying the industrial model of Total Quality 
Management (TQM) to the health care environment based on experience of attempts to implement TQM 
in health care settings. 
Chapter Nine completes the thesis by providing a brief summary of the main findings. 
CHAPTER TWO 
MEDICAL AUDIT 
Although formal medical audit was introduced to the NHS as recentiy as April 1991, concern about the 
quality of medical care is not new. The earliest recorded attempt to specify standards in medicine was 
introduced by Hammurabi, king of Babylon (1948-05 BC), who constructed" a legal code which specified 
maximum medical fees and defined the penalties to be suffered by unsuccessful surgeons (Devlin, 1988). 
ff, for example, a patient lost an eye due to an error during surgery, the surgeon also lost an eye! Modem 
medical audit on the other hand, has been defined in less punitive terms as: 
...a systematic, critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including procedures 
used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources and the resulting outcome for 
the patient. (DoH, 1989a, Chapter 5, p. 39) 
Rudimentary ideas about audit were however, developed in the United States where three major 
studies into medical education, surgical outcomes and standards of care were conducted between 1910 and 
1916. The first, by Abraham Flexner resulted in major reforms in US medical education; the second, 
conducted by Dr Ernest Codeman in 1912, was a major factor in establishing tiie American College of 
Surgeons; and the third, a survey of 692 hospitals by J.G. Bowman, a founder director of the college, 
resulted in the development of minimum standards for hospital-based surgery (Devlin, 1988; Crombie et 
al., 1993). Subsequently, the development of professional standards spread amongst other medical 
specialties and led, in 1951, to the formation of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals 
(currentiy known as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations - JCAHO). 
Indeed, external scrutiny of clinical practice, either by government or private sector agencies, is a 
significant characteristic of medical audit, sometimes called Medical Qualify Assurance or Utilization 
Review, in the United States. In Europe (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK and Sweden), Canada and 
Australia on the other hand, medical audit activities, both internal (local) and external (regional and 
national) have remained the preserve of the medical profession. Nevertheless, goverrunents in all of these 
countries are increasingly becoming involved in facilitating, or legislating for, improvements in medical 
accountabilify (Moran and Wood, 1993; Jost, 1992; Wilson, 1992; Grol et al., 1988; Austialian Council 
on Hospital Standards, 1981). 
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In the UK tiie earliest systematic attempt to assess the quahty of medical care began in 1952 when 
the Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Mortality was established. In its first report, the enquiry revealed 
that, in home dehveries, almost 90% of deaths associated with retained placenta (afterbirth) were 
potentially avoidable. Clinical guidelines were established and, during the next three year period, deaths 
from this cause were almost halved. Other significant and ongoing audits include the National External 
Quality Assessment Scheme (NEQAS) for Pathology established in 1969, and the National Confidential 
Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths which evolved from an earlier study by Buck et al. (1988). 
Despite these successes the development of audit in the UK has been relatively sporadic even 
though governmental and professional interest in the expansion of audit pre-dated Working for Patients. 
The Committee of Enquiry into Competence to Practice (Alment Committee, 1975) reported that it 
considered doctors' professionally responsible for improving their own knowledge by regularly and 
collectively assessing patient care, a view endorsed by the wide-ranging Merrison report (Royal 
Commission, HMSO, 1979). Nevertheless, it was the medical profession, through the Royal Colleges, 
tiiat largely took the lead in developing audit in tiie UK. The Royal College of General Practitioners has 
been involved in quality improvement issues almost since its inception in 1952, the Royal College of 
Radiologists established a working party into the use of diagnostic radiology in 1975, and between 1977 
and 1990, the colleges of Physicians, Surgeons and other disciplines have conducted studies and issued 
guidelines for the conduct and confidentiality of the medical audit process (Royal College of Physicians, 
1989; DoH, 1990a; Royal College of Surgeons, 1990; Crombie etal., Op. cit.). 
This historical development of audit in the UK had sigmficant impact on policy formulation and 
implementation for several reasons. Perhaps mindful of the argument, best expressed by Devlin (1988, p. 
320), that the price of clinical freedom is eternal professional vigilance", it is clear that the medical 
establishment had effectively taken control of audit before it featured prominentiy in public policj'. 
Second, the profession's control over the audit process was explicitiy though perhaps pragmatically 
acknowledged in government policy, and the sole tiueat of sanction, making participation in audit a 
condition of funding for fi-aining posts, was devolved to the Royal Colleges (DoH, 1989a, pp. 39-40). 
Third, the technical design, and thus, the basic characteristics of the audit process, were left largely to tiie 
discretion of the medical profession. 
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Although these developments did much to overcome the initial inertia displayed by many 
practitioners, they indicate that the introduction of formal medical audit, rather than being representative 
of a radical change in policy, was little more than "...the natural progression of a movement which has 
been gathering momentum [within the medical profession] over the last 20 years." (Crombie et al.. Op. 
cit., p. 17) However, in spite of the evolutionary nature of audit development in the UK, there were 
important external demands for changes in medical practice. Improved access to education for example, 
and increased life expectancy have resulted in social demands from a more knowledgeable population for 
improvements in the qualify of all goods and services provided by both the public and private sectors. 
Within the public sector, this social pressure has been reinforced by monetarist economic arguments that 
underpin the dominant political ideology which demands reductions in state intervention through 
increases in the quantify and qualify of services provided from existing resources and, as indicated above, 
there was a recognition within the medical profession that clinical practice could not function in a vacuum 
divorced from the socio-economic and political bases of its authorify. 
In response to these demands, and to the empirical and epistemological evidence resulting from 
early audit sttidies, the profession designed a base model of the audit process (Figure I , overieaf), but 
mindful of the intense intra-professional debate about issues of authorify, control, and confidentiality, they 
also defined the key characteristics of audit (Table 1) that were said to be hidden in the government 
definition (Batstone, 1990): 
Table 1: Characteristics of Medical Audit defined by the Medical Profession 
Audit is an activity thaf is led by doctors. 
It is primarily an educational process. 
The process should lead to improvements in the qiiality of pitiMt care. " 
It is a system of peer review involving voluntarS' participation. 
Standards should be set localfy by participating clinicians. 
*^9^^»4?Ptialify (br^ ^^ b^ ^^  
Sources: RCP, 1989; Batstone,..1990; Crombie o/„ 1993 
In effect, these characteristics represented the fiindamental criteria upon which the profession would 
consider the audit process acceptable given that its authorify was perceived to have been already 
challenged by general management, academics and, increasingly, by patients. Moreover, concomitant 
objectives of audit were also identffied as being: the assessment and improvement of the qualify of care; 
the enhancement of medical education; and the attainment of greater efficiency (RCP, 1989). 
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However, it was recognized that in order to achieve its objectives the audit process would need to 
accommodate setting standards, the observation of practice, comparison between practice and standards, 
and the implementation of change where necessary. Further observation and assessment would also be 
required to ensure that change was effective (RCP, Op. cit.; Batstone, 1990). 
FIGURE.l 
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Although this model has gained general acceptance, it has been challenged by those who 
emphasize education as the primary function of audit. An alternative four stage cyclical model has been 
developed and adapted by Coles (1990) and Batstone (1992) in an attempt to reconcile qualit)' 
improvement and education in a single framework (see Figiu e^ 2). 
riGURE.2 
T H E I N T E G R A T E D EDUCATIONAL AND Q U A L I T Y IMPROVEMENT C Y C L E 
OBSERV ATION 
TRIAL 
APPLICATION L O O P l 
T H E LEARNING C Y C L E 
REFLECTION 
REASSURANCE OR 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
MEW IDEAS 
LOOP 2 IMPLEMENT 
CHANGE STANDARDS 
THE OPERATIONAL 
C Y C L E 
ASSESSMENT OF 
CONFORMANCE 
WITH 
STANDARDS 
Adapted from: Coles, 1990: Batstone, 1992 
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The illustrations at Figures 1 and 2 represent the extent of the debate over a framework for the 
conduct of audit during the first three years of its formal introduction to the NHS. Coles and Batstone 
argue that the integrated model not only facilitates the learning process, but also minimizes the risk of 
inappropriate or untested standards being applied to medical practice. On tlie other hand, standards based 
on the prior observation of practice may be lower than what is either desirable or possible. In addition, 
others have argued that medical audit is not research and though it may feed the research agenda, it need 
not extend the epistemological base of medicine (Bhopal and Thomson, 1992; Crombie et ai, Op. cit.). 
Confusion between medical audit and medical research is compounded by their use of similar methods and 
techniques; each requires that studies are adequately designed to reduce sampling error or other sources of 
bias, both use statistical techniques and may involve the use of qualitative and/or quantitative methods -
significantly, the tools of the social rather than the medical sciences. However, while research is 
concerned with global advances in knowledge, audit is concerned with an assessment of the extent to 
wliich existing knowledge and resources are being correctly utilized in a given locality. In short, the 
debate over an appropriate framework for the audit process reflects in part, clinicians' unfamiliarity in the 
use and applicability of social science methods, and partly uncertainty about the imphed precision of 
'standards' within the somewhat imprecise world of medical practice. Although the audit cycle will, 
undoubtedly, continue to be adapted and refined as clinicians gain experience in the audit process, all 
models produced thus far are essentially variations of the design illustrated at Figure 1. 
In its basic form, the audit cycle can be associated with distinct methodological tasks which 
provide an insight into a potential, task-based, division of labour within the audit process (see Figiu-e 3, 
overleaf). Setting standards for clinical practice is clearly a task solely for the medical profession, but 
involves the identification of measurement criteria. The measurement phase on the other hand, involves 
data collection, statistical analyses and interpretation, of which the first two are time consuming and 
essentially technical tasks that do not require clinical skills. Conversely, the interpretation of such data 
must be conducted by medically qualified staff. At stage three of the audit process the range of actors 
involved will depend on the resource implications of desired change and may therefore involve managers. 
Finally, the success or otherwise of an audit project will depend crucially upon the assessment of change. 
Thus, the final phase will require the combination of technical and medical skills employed during phase 
two and possibly the involvement of management when further action is considered necessary. 
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The task-based division of labour identified within the audit cycle (Figure 3.) is not a mere 
sociological abstraction derived from the base model of the audit cycle, but represents a practical 
framework which was established for the conduct of audit at a time when few practitioners fiilly 
understood the audit process and existing NHS information systems were designed for other purposes. 
The most common of these, the patient administration system (PAS), routinely captures demographic and 
basic in-patient data such as discharge diagnosis, follow-up arrangements and lengths of stay. Although 
such data can be utilized in audit programmes, PAS does not contain detailed information of the kind 
required to conduct an audit of specific aspects of clinical management. Similarly, though other common 
information systems do contain clinical data, for example, in pathology, radiology and pharmacy, these are 
designed primarily to automate the production of the results of diagnostic tests and reports, or to record 
drug prescription information, but they reveal little about why a particular course of action was chosen in 
the first place, or whether it was elfective. Consequentiy, the patient record provided the primary source 
of medical audit information, but had the major disadvantage of being a time consuming source for 
aggregate data due to the individuality of their focus, and also because of illegibility, inaccuracy or 
incompleteness. Indeed, many early audit studies focused specifically on improving the accuracy and 
completeness of the medical record in accordance with guidelines produced by the Royal Colleges, (see, 
for example, Royal College of Surgeons of England, 1990). 
Thus, in response to technical needs associated with the methodological implications of the audit 
cycle (Figure 3.), and to the shortcomings of existing data systems, central 'ring-fenced' funding was made 
available for distribution among provider units by Regional Health Authorities to ensure the provision of 
administrative staff and better information systems in support of medical audit programmes. However, 
partly because of a general acceptance of the defined characteristics of the audit process (Table 1, p. 16, 
above), and possibly because of managerial unease about the success of the initiative, fiieled by murmurs of 
resistance to audit by some doctors, control over these additional human and financial resources was 
largely transferred to tiie medical profession - (though management consent is usually a necessar>' 
condition for capital or revenue expenditijre which had recurrent cost implications). These developments, 
though intended to facilitate the implementation process, may prove to limit or undermine tiie concept of 
increasing medical accountability through audit since, at the outset, audit was elfectively re-defined by 
doctors, and was designed and controlled, at local level, by the medical profession. 
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By definition and design, medical audit is largely, though not exclusively, a local activity and 
medical control over the audit process is clearly illustrated in the local organization of audit which, in the 
hospital sector, revolves around and is directed by a Local Medical Audit Committee (LMAC), usually a 
formally constituted body established by and accountable to the Medical Staff Committee. Audit support 
staff generally report directiy to the chair of the LMAC and are bound by a formal confidentialit>' 
statement which is usually integral to the LMAC constitution. Moreover, LMAC chairmen may also 
perform a liaison function with General Practitioners (GPs) through membership of the local Medical 
Audit Advisory Group (MAAG) which coordinates audit in primary care and, though accountable to the 
Family Health Service Authority (FHSA), is largely medical in membership. Furthermore, while medical 
audit in the primary sector addresses distinct clinical issues, it is conducted within the same cyclical 
framework that has been applied in the acute sector (Figure 1). Hence, there is, in medical audit terms, a 
certain affinity between GPs, as purchasers, and hospital based practitioners, as providers, with regard to 
the issues and tensions posed by the audit initiative and it is unlikely therefore, that GP purchasers will, at 
least in the short term, be prepared to specify explicit clinical criteria within their contracts with hospital 
based provider units. As a result, clinical accountability through medical audit will not only continue to 
be pursued through local professional hierarchies, but, established mechanisms apart, will remain 
effectively closed to external scrutiny. In short, with one major exception, the concept of medical audit in 
the UK is, in all relevant respects, fundamentally different to the model of audit through ex-ternal 
governmental or business (insurance) controlled review adopted in the USA (Jost, 1992). The exception 
on the other hand, concerns a common acceptance of some theories about quality in health care. 
UK practitioners turned to the American experience and adopted a theoretical construct devised 
by Dr. Avedis Donabedian. Donabedian's theoretical division of a health care deliver>' system was 
devised in order to introduce logical and systematic methods into the review of hospital practice, and 
although it is somewhat limited, it remains the bedrock upon which all subsequent healtii care quality 
improvement techniques are based. Donabedian recognizes the importance of technical and interpersonal 
(social) systems in health care organizations, but argues that their complex interaction may render tiieni 
inseparable (Donabedian, 1980). Health care settings are unique in that the production and consumption 
of services often occurs simultaneously within a relatively small spatial area and thus, tiie distinction 
between technical and socio-psychological processes is often blurred. 
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Donabedian devised a model that allowed for the totality of hospital activit>' to be distinguished 
within three dimensions, namely, structure, process and outcome (Donabedian, 1969). Examples of 
structure include the provision of equipment, the suitability of the estate, the availability of suitably trained 
and qualified staff, the organization of service delivery, and the production of policies, procedures and 
protocols. Structure is essentially concerned with inputs into the health care system and is thus, the least 
difficult dimension to measure and improve through the application of the audit cycle. However, for 
Donabedian, process is the 'primary object' upon which quality improvement audit should focus since it 
represents the sum of all activities involving patients' interaction with the health care provider. 
Management and administration, admission, consultation, diagnosis, prescription, therapy, cross-specialtj' 
and inter-unit referral, and discharge are but some examples of process. Yet, patient episodes never 
coincide with a single process, and it is acknowledged within the medical profession that single 
disciplinary or sub-specialty audit can only have a limited impact on the overall qualit>' of service 
experienced by patients. 
At its most simple, outcome represents the change in a patient's health status that results from 
medical intervention, but it is clear that all activities described as either structure or process may influence 
outcome. Moreover, all issues of structure are part of the process of administration. In short, the 
original Donabedian construct exhibits a static, almost linear progression from structure, through process, 
to outcome, whereas the actual delivery of care results from multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinar>' 
interaction. Furthermore, the availability of meaningfiil outcome indicators is scarce and is the subject of 
much contemporary social and medical research. In spite of these limitations, the fusion of Donabedian's 
theoretical model with the framework provided by the audit cycle promises closer integration between the 
plarming and execution of medical quality improvement activities. However, this is not, by itself, 
sufficient for effecting substantial change. What criteria for example, should be used for evaluating the 
quality of clinical practice or an aspect of the health care service? An influential paper by R.J. Maxwell 
(1984) contains six criteria which provide a basis for the evaluation of health care quality in terms of 
either structure, process or outcome. Maxwell's six dimensions of quality which can be measured and 
assessed are, accessibility, relevance, effectiveness, equity, social acceptability and efficiency. In the 
UK, economy can be considered an further dimension given current government policy, but, in the USA, 
because of the different organization and funding of health care, equity and economy are less central to the 
definition of health care quality held by external assessors (lost, Op. cit). 
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The above mentioned dimensions of quality may however, have varying levels of significance for 
different professional groups within the health delivery system. Accessibility, equity and social 
acceptability for example, are sensitive issues which have gained their fiiUest political expression in the 
form of the Patients Charter and the retention of Community Health Councils and are thus, broad concerns 
of executive management. Though, where speed of access can be shown to influence clinical outcome, in 
patients suffering from a cerebral vascular accident (stroke) for example, doctors, explicitiy committed to 
equity via the Hippocratic Oath, will also, albeit more narrowly, be concerned with accessibility. 
The dimension of relevance, or appropriateness may, on the other hand, promote much debate 
within the medical profession since the mere raising of the issue carries an implicit suggestion of 
inappropriate treatments or resource usage which might be attributable to individual practitioners. Yet, 
given the extent of medical control over the audit process, managers are unlikely to peer too deeply into 
this question other than through the Resource Management initiative. Nevertheless, in the USA, clinical 
relevance is addressed through the medical aspects of distinct Risk Management progranmies (see Chapter 
Three) which, because of actual or potential increases of health related litigation in the UK, will 
undoubtedly appear on the NHS management agenda in the near future. In contrast, the dimensions of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness are at the forefront of the issues currentiy facing the NHS 
professions. Yet, while the new contractual processes necessarily constrain financial and operational 
managers to focus on economy and efficiency, clinicians have ethical reasons for focusing primarily on the 
effectiveness of their actions even though, at a certain level of interpretation, the individual or collective 
effect of medical interventions may be limited because of the opportunity costs of uneconomical or 
inefficient practices. 
Nevertheless, the convergence of the Donabedian model with the technical framework of the audit 
cycle and Maxwell's evaluative criteria illustrates the emergence of a potentially powerful tool for 
improving the quality of medical care in the NHS. Much will depend however, on doctor participation in 
the audit process, and on the extent to which the results of medical audit can be transformed into 
meaningfiil action. In short, for medical audit to have a significant impact, the crucial challenge facing 
managers and clinicians is to recognize the interdependence of the various dimensions of quality. 
CHAPTER THREE 
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
In the early 1980s, Total Quality Management (TQM) became the most popular business management 
pliilosophy in the industrialized world. Yet, despite its widespread appeal, the precise meaning of TQM 
remains ambiguous and its successfiil implementation correspondingly sporadic (Oakland, 1989; Flood, 
1993). These issues thus provide a justification for examining the roots, principles, objectives and 
technical practices associated with TQM, a concept that Koch (1991) argues, is not optional, but must 
become an integral aspect of modern health care systems. 
The TQM concept originated in post-war Japan which, having been reduced to the status of a 
non-combatant in military terms, turned to economic development to secure its place in the new world 
order. In the early 1950s, when the West was preoccupied with social reconstruction, the Cold War and 
otiier conflicts, the Japanese, conscious of the poor quality of their products, enlisted tiie help of American 
pioneers in quality management, notably W. Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran. Deming established 
a basis for the development of Statistical Process Control (SPC), a method applied to processes that are 
repetitive and where outcomes are quantifiable. A process is said to be under control when variations in 
measured outcomes are random. On the other hand, when specific causes of deviation emerge, the 
process is no longer said to be under control. 
Influenced by Deming, a number of Japanese students took interest in quality improvement, 
including Kaoru Ishikawa who developed 'cause and effect' diagrams and Genichi Taguchi who 
championed the introduction of pre-production quality controls as an aid to minimizing both the 
organizational and societal costs of poor quality (Flood, Op. cit., pp. 30-32). However, the main 
contribution made by Deming's early work, and that of his students, was to establish the TQM principle of 
managing product or service delivery through the systematic use of data as opposed to 'gut feeling' based 
on past experience of process performance. Nonetheless, quality control procedures are largely designed 
to prevent process changes that result from adverse events, and as such, they are directed at sporadic 
quality problems rather than underi>ing or chronic issues which require fundamental changes in order to 
improve process design or methods of execution (Juran and Gryna, 1993, pp. 40-41 and 98-99). 
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Sporadic quality problems cause unexpected and unplaimed changes in process inputs and 
operations and demand immediate action to restore the process to a state of control; sporadic quality 
problems are thus tackled by the people who do the work and quality control (QC) programmes are 
designed to resist unplanned change - (where a process is consistently shown to be under control, then 
quality is assured). Chronic quality problems on the other hand, refer to underlying and sustained 
impediments to better process performance and must, therefore, be tackled by an improvement programme 
which is designed to promote change ( Juran and Gryna, Ibid.). This is not to say that qualit)' control 
procedures and quality improvement programmes are incompatible, but rather that they have distinct aims 
and may employ different methods and techniques. Hence, before discussing other sources of ambiguitj' 
within the TQM concept, it may prove fruitful to re-examine the Audit Cycle (Chapter Two, p. 17) within 
the framework provided above in order to illustrate whether, and in what sense, it may be described as a 
quality control mechanism, a quality assurance procedure, or a quality improvement programme. 
In Figure 4a (below, p. 27), the audit cycle represents a QC mechanism, a description that is 
crucially dependent on taking corrective action in order to restore a process or procedure to what is 
regarded as acceptable. Conversely, where practice is monitored and is considered acceptable, then no 
action is required, but both patients and staff gain reassurance, hence the QA label is more appropriate 
(Figure 4b). Alternatively, in order to be described as a quality improvement programme, a 
professionally determined characteristic of the audit process (see Chapter Two, p. 16, Table 1), the audit 
cycle would need to be redesigned to include some of the features identified by Coles and Batstone (see 
Chapter Two, p. 17, Figure 2). However, as Rakich et.al. (1992, p. 407) note, in health care 
organizations, there is a "...potential conflict between CQI [Continuous Quality Improvement] and 
professional autonomy". On one hand, there is a need for a formal and competent body to determine 
priorities for improvement, the creation of which might create conflict within professions. On the other 
hand, many processes that contribute to the outcome of medical intervention are not 'owned' by the 
medical profession and thus, meaningful improvement would need multidisciplinar}' inputs into an 
activity that is 'primarily a matter for the medical profession' (see p. 7). Moreover, as Figure 4c 
illustrates, both the QC and QA functions are integral to the improvement process which may be described 
as an extension of the basic audit cycle. In short, if there is general acceptance of the characteristics of 
audit determined by the medical profession (p. 16, Table 1), then the basic audit cycle is both conceptually 
and technically inadequate to achieve at least one of its stated objectives. 
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A brief analysis of the TQM conceptual statement may reveal other ambiguities associated with 
the meaning of total quality. There is on the one hand, a common assumption that total quality simply 
means setting and consistendy meeting standards throughout an organization in order to assure consumers 
that a quality product or service is being provided (Ellis and Whittington, 1993). Indeed, accreditation 
agencies such as the British Standards Institute, the International Standards Organization and, in UK 
health care, the King's Fund Centre, provide programmes that enable accredited organizations to qualify 
for the 'quality assured' (QA) ati;ribute. However, as Conti (1993) notes, quality based solely on external 
accreditation is limited to attaining the 'standard' requirements for entry into a competitive market and 
does little to distinguish between commodities or their suppliers. Interestingly, this view is shared by the 
King's Fund Centre which states that: 
Organisational audit [accreditation] alone cannot provide an assurance of quality, but 
must form part of a managed approach to the provision of healthcare....While 
organisational audit cannot guarantee the quality of healthcare offered, it is a good 
measure of the hospital's ability to sustain a quality clinical service. This will have 
considerable significance in the proposed purchaser/provider system of healthcare 
plannedfor this country. (King's Fund Centre, October, 1990, p. 25) 
Moreover, mere conformance with standards, though necessary, is not sufficient since it implies a 
static upper limit of attainment which may conceal any potential for improvement. In short, assurances 
about quality that are achieved solely through retrospective inspection are severely flawed since they allow 
for the retention of poor quality in production or service delivery processes. 
On the other hand, when the 'total quality' statement is suffixed with the term management the 
TQM concept has tended to be subject to fundamental "...misconceptions about [the nature of] quality, 
management and organizations." (Flood, Op. cit., pp. xii). Flood argues that the substantial failure of 
TQM at the implementation stage reflects insufficient attention by the quality gurus to mainstream 
management and organization theories. Conversely, some quality specialists ascribe to the \'iew tiiat a 
major cause of failure in quality management stems from a lack of tiaining in the quality disciplines 
amongst conventional managers. Quality planning, argues Juran (1992, p. 3) "...has been done by 
amateurs". TQM however, contains two distinct elements with which, these apparentiy competing 
positions are concerned, that is, there is a need for a conceptual fit with the actual or desired structiire and 
culture, and for a technical design which is consistent with the aims of the organization. In short, 
compatibility between structure and function is a prerequisite for effective TQM implementation. 
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Juran's major contribution to the development of a TQM philosophy was to identify continuous 
quality improvement (CQI) as a primary objective of 'total quality'. The CQI principle has become central 
to contemporary interpretations of TQM since it represents the primary technique through which chronic 
quality problems are systematically removed or minimized. However, CQI involves the provision of skills 
and the delegation of authority to front line employees to enable them to focus upon, define, analyze and, 
where desirable, change processes that are within their sphere of competence. In healthcare, effective 
CQI has four key characteristics (Rakich et al., Op. cit., p. 409). First, outputs must meet the 
expectations of both internal and external consumers. Second, both prospective and retrospective 
monitoring are essential to prevent poor quality. Third, quality is the concern of all employees. Fourth, 
quality improvement programmes must focus on processes as well as outcomes . In short, TQM demands 
that employees are empowered to effect CQI, but this poses profound challenges to mainstream 
management theories and often provokes a 'rejection crisis' amongst the established hierarchy (Conti, Op. 
at., p. 9). 
Figure 5. 
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First, it requires a conceptual shift on the part of senior management in order to facilitate the 
transformation of organizational structures and values to reflect a genuine quality ethos, including the 
integration of quality improvement activities as part of the working practices of all employees. This latter 
point is crucial to understanding the meaning of TQM since it represents the small'm' management of 
quality throughout the totality of an organization (Flood, Op. Cit., p. 47). Second, the technical design of 
the quality system must include mechanisms for quality control, assurance and improvement that are 
supported by data systems which reveal information about operational performance. 
Although these substantive distinctions may help to clarify the meaning of TQM, to be 
conceptually adequate, the precise detail of any new organizational paradigm must take account of 
internal social and external environmental circumstances in order to identify current and desired 
characteristics of the organization. As Flood {Ibid, pp. 86-7) further argues, perceptions that consider an 
organization to be either mechanistic, organic, culturally specific, political, or a combination of all these 
features, will demand different or variable treatments to effect desired change. Moreover, though 
purchaser or consumer interests may provide inputs into product or service specifications, because of tiie 
non-profit nature of most healthcare organizations, the dynamics of change must come from within the 
provider organization (Ovretveit, 1992). However, to be technically adequate on the other hand, any new 
quality management paradigm must accommodate or improve upon existing quality fimctions tiiat are 
considered necessary in support of the organizations specific aims. 
Within the context of healthcare organizations, maintaining and impro\'ing the qualit>' of care 
has always been a central concern of practitioners. In the NHS for example, the medical, nursing and 
allied professions function in an almost continuous state of flux as they absorb the impact of new 
technology, the application of medical science and changes in social policy or administrative procedure 
that are designed to improve care or service delivery. Indeed, healthcare systems are open to constant 
change, yet require functional continuity. Within this operational paradox, the issue of quality is 
commonly addressed by conducting problem-oriented exercises which find popular ex-pression in 
retrospective QA monitoring systems or periodic analyses of patient complaints. However, as argued 
above, conformance to QA standards is a static process which, by definition, cannot effect improvement 
and does littie, therefore, to assure either patients, purchasers or staff tiiat a quality service is being 
provided. 
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The development of a total approach to health care quality may, therefore, have much to offer 
NHS provider units. In the USA, the Joint Commission are currentiy promoting the transition fl-om QA 
to CQI in healthcare quality and have re-defined the term QA to mean Quality Assessment and 
Improvement (JCAHO, 1991). The Commission continue however, to place significant importance on 
conformance with professional and technical standards and thus, existing quality control and quality 
assurance monitoring mechanisms are retained (JCAHO, 1993). A similar situation exists in Canada 
where QC, QA and CQI co-exist in what Wilson (1992) describes as a complimentary model that reflects 
the special need of healthcare organizations to retain a measure of technical control over some functions 
while empowering employees to improve the way in which tasks are executed. In both Canada and the 
USA there is nevertheless, much emphasis on the changing the quality focus from individual performance 
to organizational-wide quality issues in an attempt to "...give rise to a new paradigm for defining expected 
organizational behaviors in the assessment and improvement of patient care." (JCAHO, 1993, p. iii; 
Wilson, Op. cit., p. 358) Consequently, multidisciplinary teamwork and other TQM techniques represent 
the principle mechanisms through which change is to be effected. In the UK there is also an awareness 
that, since the delivery of care is inter-professional, quality assessment, evaluation and improvement must 
also cut across established boundaries and, ipso facto, depends as much on the people within the 
organization as it does on technical systems (Krebs, 1992; Townsend, 1992; EUis and Whittington, 1993). 
In short, an acceptance of TQM does not necessarily imply a rejection of older methods, for though tiiey 
may be inadequate, they may not be entirely obsolete - a distinction that may further serve to clarify some 
of the ambiguity within the total quality concept. However, TQM does require cultural change, the nature 
and scale of which may be illustrated by examining a key component of CQI progranmies. 
Process management is a central feature of CQI and may be defined, in the context of healthcare, 
as a method for enhancing patient and purchaser satisfaction on a continual basis by sj'stematically 
focusing on, defining, analyzing and improving processes. A distinguishing characteristic of a significant 
process is that its outputs represent the sum of activities conducted by one or more permanent teams who 
are concerned with the organization of human and material resources which, through working practices, 
are combined to achieve a specific outcome (Juran and Gryna, Op. cit., p. 541). Hence, a process, since it 
is concerned with more than the sum of its constituent parts, is a concept based on general systems theor>' 
Bertalanfiy (1968). 
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In order to avoid further ambiguity, and because most hospital provider units are organized along 
functional lines. Figure 6 (overleaf) illustrates the nature of differences between process and functional 
management. The primary concern of functional management is to ensure that operational activities are 
directed towards the achievement of departmental and corporate objectives and thus, responsibility, 
authority and control are key organizing concepts in fimctional management. However, even if the 
technical execution of activities is consistent with established departmental policies or standards, it does 
not follow that optimal process performance is achieved in terms of either economy, efficiency or 
effectiveness. On the other hand, process management is predominantiy consumer oriented and is 
designed to focus on the sum of cross-functional activities, both within and between departments (only 
inter-departmental process are illustrated in Figure 6), that combine to meet patient needs. 
Processes can, therefore, be regarded as major determinants of patient satisfaction, and 
coordination is a key organizing concept in process management. Thus, in order to assure or increase 
patient satisfaction, there is a need to establish mechanisms and apply techniques that will facilitate 
process improvement on a continual basis. 
Nevertheless, macro-processes, such as those illustrated overleaf, are influenced by an infinite 
number of other meso and micro-level processes that cross-cut the fraditional task-based hierarchies found 
within departments and thus, impact on service delivery both to patients and internal clients. Indeed, 
almost all hospital departments provide and receive services to and from one another. Medical staff for 
example, are internal clients of pathology and radiology; pharmacy provides services for patients, doctors 
and nurses in wards or special care areas; inter-professional referral and consultation is conmion between 
physicians, surgeons and other medical staff; and administrative departments, such as estates and human 
resources, are service providers to the entire organization. Moreover, client dissatisfaction occurs when 
service delivery fails to match expectations, but the latter may be influenced by inaccurate or incorrect 
assumptions about how, and why, activities are conducted in a certain way. Process management is 
therefore, a means of reducing uncertainty and enhancing inter-professional communication and is 
extremely applicable ,to healthcare provider organizations. But its success depends crucially on 
establishing process 'ownership' and delegating the authority necessary to effect improvement. In short, 
process improvement iiieans employee empowerment. 
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Although employee empowerment in pursuit of process improvement may require cultural 
transformation, it need not involve radical change to existing organizational strucmres. Figure 7 
(overleaf) illustrates how a process management steering team, led by an executive director, can be formed 
from senior members of established functional departments. This team can facilitate the improvement 
programme by focusing on chronic quality problems identified in macro-processes (Figure 6, above), 
thereby allowing for inputs from internal clients, patients and purchasers. Moreover, quality issues thus 
identified, are delegated for resolution by an operational management or work team which has major 
responsibility for the process in question - in Figure 7, teams are illustrated in relation to aspects of a 
pathology service. In addition, team leaders are members of the next senior team in the functional 
management hierarchy and thus, this form of organization allows for the integration of leadership, 
direction, control, and communication within the process management system. These features are 
important since, in multi-disciplinary groups especially, the team may not have direct line management 
responsibility for all process activities. However, a central feature of the system is that it allows for the 
delegation of responsibility and authority to those who do own specific parts of a process and whose 
expertise is, therefore, "...critical to understanding and documenting the process." (Rakich, et. ai, Op. cit., 
p. 420) Where, for example, a process cuts across fiinctional boundaries at operational level, multi-
disciplinary groups, similar in composition to the senior steering team, can be established to lead and 
direct the improvement programme at lower levels in the organization. Hence, process management 
allows for a measure of integration between planning and execution and is thus, an improvement on 
outdated principles of scientific management. It is important to note however, that although the process 
management programme is permanent, improvement teams are project oriented and, apart from the senior 
management steering team, are temporary and have clearly defined objectives and time scales. 
Nevertheless, in order to perform successfully, team activities must be conducted according to 
structured procedures that should be entrenched within an organization's central value system, and team 
members, potentially all members of an organization, must be trained to use a variet)' of quality 
improvement tools. Such tools have been developed in the industrial sector, but attempts are being made 
to refine their application within healthcare. These tools are designed to support the four technical stages 
of the process management system, viz, focus, definition, analysis and improvement, terms that are 
consistent with the Shewhart/Deming PCDA wheel (see p. 28, above). 
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The first stage of process management, focus or 'plan' after Shewhart/Deming, involves the 
construction of a mission statement based on the direction provided by a senior management or other 
steering team and may include feedback from patients or other client groups. In addition, all input issues 
are clarified, resource needs identified and time scales established for completion of the improvement 
project. Crucially however, process ownership must be determined and, where appropriate, issues may be 
deployed to other improvement teams (see Figure 8, overleaf). Stage two concerns process definition (or 
'do' after Shewhart/Deming) and is facilitated by the use of flowcharts (see Figure 9, p. 37, below). 
Process flowcharts ensure that the sum of activities that contribute to the current design of a process are 
identified in order to allow for the development of the standards and measurement criteria required for 
Stage three, (analysis or 'check' after Shewhart/Deming). As Figure 8 illustrates, stage three is consistent 
with the medical audit cycle and may therefore include the QC function to restore a process to a state of 
control or provide reassurance (QA). Indeed, during the conduct of the process management definition 
exercise illustrated at Figure 9, team members identified quality controls that were inherent within the 
process, though no-one had thought to measure the scale or frequency of deviation from QC standards. 
Finally, the analysis and evaluation of data provides an indication about process performance, a requisite 
condition for identifying and prioritizing opportunities for improvement that, in turn, provide a basis for 
action in Stage four, (improve or 'act' after Shewhart/Deming). In sum, stages one to three in Figure 8 
represent the central features of a quality management programme. However, when stage four is added, 
and the entire system is implemented throughout an organization as an integral and continuous aspect of 
the working practices of all employees, then the management of quality can be said to be total. Hence, 
TQM and the centiality of CQI within the concept. 
Nevertheless, contemporary healthcare organizations contain considerable structural constiaints 
to the successful implementation of TQM. On the one hand, healthcare is delivered through what 
McLaughlin and Kaluzny (1990) call the 'clinical professional model' where tieatment and care are lead 
by relatively autonomous clinical professions which, tiaditionally, assign responsibilitj' at the level of the 
individual. TQM in healthcare on the other hand, tiiough it acknowledges clinical participation, 
presupposes managerial leadership, demands improvement rather tiian conformance, emphasizes process 
rather than individual performance and, in short, "...represents a paradigm shift in health care 
management [that] presents a series of potential conflict areas in the way health care organizations are 
organized." (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, Ibid, p. 7). 
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In contrast, other aspects of healthcare quality demand the retention of the traditional narrow 
view about performance. Quality Control, including its implicit QA feature, is essentially a mechanical 
function and is shown in Figures 4, 8 and 9 to be a necessary aspect of a healthcare quality programme. 
Such programmes may however, also include Risk Management. In brief, the risk management concept 
evolved in USA healthcare during the 1970s as a more systematic alternative to general safety 
programmes. It is concerned with risk prevention and to reduce the effect of untoward incidents on 
patients, visitors or staff, and to minimize financial loss to the organization. However, by the early 1990s 
the concept was expanded to include "...operational linkages between the risk management functions 
related to the clinical aspects of patient care and safety and [the] quality assessment and improvement 
function." (JCAHO, 1992, p. 144) Clinical risk management involves the designation of 'risk factors' that 
are associated either with a patient's condition or with treatment and care and it includes the development 
of protocols for clinical management following the identification of a risk, factor. Consequently, risk 
management, QC and CQI tend to overlap with the former two providing inputs into the latter. 
In sum, though the organization of CQI through process management is technically compatible 
with traditional hierarchical structures (see Figure 7, p. 32, above), the participative and collaborative 
nature of the improvement process is not consistent with the mechanistic social system inherent in formal 
bureaucracies. Moreover, although general managers may attempt to alter the central value system of a 
healthcare provider organization, they have little direct influence on the macro-level bases of clinical 
professional autonomy. However, for the medical profession, autonomy need not mean absolute control: 
"...what is essential [for medical staff] is control over the determination and 
evaluation of the technical knowledge used in the work; important but secondary is 
control of the social and economic terms of the work....a [medical] professional may 
[thus] remain a professional when he is socially subordinate to someone who does not 
belong to his profession so long as he is not technically subordinate." (Freidson, 1988, 
pp. 185-6) 
It follows therefore, that, where the technical evaluation of distinctly medical issues is conducted by 
medical staff, through medical audit for example, the success of TQM, being concerned with the totality of 
service delivery, will depend largely on the extent to which managers assimilate quality improvement 
concepts and adapt required elements of the formal organization to a more organic design, while retaining 
mechanistic features where necessary, in respect of quality control procedures for example. 
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This is not to say however, that the clinical professions should limit their quality related activities 
to audit. In spite of the new corporate identity that is emerging in many provider units, the medical 
profession in particular retain a large measure of tiaditional authority and may therefore, be regarded as 
key change agents. It is crucial however, that to avoid the TQM failure experienced by many business 
corporations (Flood, Op. cit.) and to describe health care quality management as 'total', executive 
directors and senior managers must find space at, or near, the top of their agenda, on a continual basis, for 
ensuring that quality issues permeate all organizational systems, relate to all functions and include all 
employees. This is so because 'quality', however defined, refers not only to tiie inherent utilit}' or 
goodness of a product or service, but also to the extent to which it satisfies the primary criteria of a quality 
conscious organization, viz, meeting the expectations and needs of both internal and external customers. 
Finally, the word 'management' means that quality improvement is no accident, but is a deliberate, 
planned, systematic, measurable and continuous process. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NEW CONTEXT 
OF THE NATIONAL H E A L T H S E R V I C E 
The creation of an internal market in UK health care is a cential feature of recent NHS reforms and is 
intended to promote 'managed competition' in pursuit of greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness in 
the delivery of care and services (Ham, 1991). Yet, government have retained the principles of providing 
universal access, free at the point of delivery and financed through general taxation. Thus, the impact of 
internal market arrangements is likely to be most visible at the meso level of the health care system where 
the roles of service provision and purchasing have been formally separated. 
Moreover, as a result of the purchaser-provider split, the external environment and the internal 
organisation of health care provider units have altered considerably and have interacted to create a 
radically new context within which care and services are delivered. This new context can be considered 
essentially social in character because it involves the redefinition of existing relationships or the 
development of new relations within and between the constituent parts of the NHS. It follows therefore, 
that, since the objectives of the internal market are primarily technical in nature, (economy, effectiveness 
and eflrciency), there are reasonable grounds for considering the impact of changes in the health care 
social system in terms of planned changes to the technical system that are inherent within the Medical 
Audit and Total Quality Management initiatives. Furthermore, many recent changes in the NHS can be 
considered as a practical manifestation of ideological approaches to management and economic issues in 
UK health care (Young, 1991; Mark and Scott, 1992; Maynard, 1993), issues that are rooted in structural 
flaws within the NHS that can only be explained by understanding something of its origin and 
development (Harrison, et. al., 1990, p. 31). 
Given the universality of its founding principles, the creation of the National Health Service in 
1948 is regarded as a watershed in British social policy. In practice however, gross inequalities remained 
in terms of the distribution of resources, accessibility and the health stams of tiie population. While some 
studies have shown that health status is not merely (or wholly) determined by tiie availability of health 
care (Whitehead, 1987; Townsend and Davidson, 1988), others have pointed to fundamental deficiencies 
in the design of the NHS concept. 
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Aneurin Bevan's NHS blueprint involved the nationalisation of existing services, a process that 
included the transfer of extant weaknesses of resource allocation to the new health care system (Mays, 
1991). Moreover, despite central control over health service fiinding and a measure of political consensus 
about objectives, the administration and organization of the NHS were significantly influenced by a 
powerful medical lobby which was largely successful in protecting professional interests. Conflict also 
existed between political parties about how objectives were to be achieved and rather than being a radical 
iimovation, the nationalised health service represented a politically ex-pedient compromise between the 
authority of medicine and principles of public administration (Klein, 1989), 
Nevertheless, the NHS was established by a government faced with the task of post-war 
reconstruction, a task that was more immediate than were issues about the internal functioning of specific 
institutions (Richman, 1987). However, by the early 1950s the efficient delivery of health care had 
become an issue of major political concern and was formally linked to the management of the service. 
Costs had rapidly exceeded official estimates and although the first major inquiry into the NHS (MoH, 
1956) found no evidence of inefficiency, its Chairman reported that there was no ".. sufBcient 
consciousness of responsibility for capital assets....comparable with that felt in a business concern" (quoted 
in Graham, 1993, p. 9). Ofiicial estimates were based on the mistaken assumption that imiversal access 
to health care would result in reductions in levels of morbidity, and thus, in costs. But the estimates did 
not allow for the impact of demographic changes, inflation or new technology partly because competing 
claims for public funds posed a dilemma for the Atflee government who were faced with the reconciliation 
of the irreconcilable. Responsibility within the hospitals was difficult to identify and define. These 
secondary sector health care providers, though delivering services locally, had administrative structures 
that were appointed by central government (Richman, Ibid). 
It is clear therefore, that from the outset, the NHS was beset with fimdamental problems 
concerning resources, organization and management that have "...bequeathed a long agenda for action 
to....NHS policy-makers....[while] the price paid for creating a consensus....was to introduce a bias towards 
inertia." (Klein, Op. cit., p. 58) During the past twenty years government have addressed these structural 
flaws by tackling the issues of organization and administiation (DHSS, 1972a, 1972b), by addressing the 
problem of resources (DHSS, 1976), and more recentiy through an emphasis on management and 
accountabilify (DHSS, 1984, DoH, 1989a). 
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The NHS is one of the largest public organisations in the United Kingdom; it employs about 1.25 
million people and salaries amount to around 75 per cent of its budget (Connah and Pearson, 1991). In 
addition, occupational stratification is an inherent feature of the NHS culture; Komer estimates for 1984 
suggest that there were around 5,000 difierent NHS occupational combinations by grade or type of work 
(in Connah and Pearson, Ibid.). It follows that, with only a quarter of NHS costs devoted to material 
resources, the development of a modem health service presupposes an effective social system in order to 
underpin developments in the technical system. Moreover, many of the reforms outlined in Working for 
Patients (DoH, 1989a) are intended to increase service responsiveness to patients needs. However, as 
Graham {Op. cit., p. 12) argues, though the NHS is moving towards the "...right territory - health status 
not health services" it may be doing so at an inappropriate point in time given the contemporary economic 
and political climate, and that managerial skills and organizational structiires may still be inadequate. 
Thus, before discussing contextual changes at the meso-level of the health care delivery sj'Stem, it is 
necessary to illustrate the significance of macro-level changes in the formal structure of the NHS. 
The proposals contained in Working for Patients were brought into force by the NHS and 
Community Care Act of 1990. This legislation also enacted proposals in two other White Papers which 
focused on Family Practitioner Committees {Promoting Better Health, DHSS, 1987) and changes in 
arrangements for handicapped and elderly people {Caring for People, DHSS, 1989). Although the 
success of these changes depended on the introduction of general management, the latter can be regarded 
as a pragmatic response to the debate over government expenditure (Young, 1991; Mark and Scott, Op. 
cit.; Maynard, Op. cit.). Nonetheless, recent macro-level changes to the NHS structure (see Figure 10, 
overleaf) have created a turbulent USA type context in which managers of provider units face a 
combination of uncertainty, instability and meso-level volatility as well as increased competition from 
other provider units and the pressures associated with the general shift away from hospital to community-
based care (Berger and Kurtz, 1991; Goldsmith, 1985). Although the macro-level reform of the NHS 
appears to be purely structural it is clear that, given the projected numerical dontinance of Trusts which, 
by 1 April 1994, will spend around 90 per cent of hospital and community service revenue (Health 
Services Year Book, 1994), the relationship between NHS health care provider units and their primar>' 
customers (patients) will be mediated solely by contiacts through die titird party purchasing organizations 
(see Figure 10, overieaf). 
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NHS STRUCTURE (July 1994) 
Figure 10. 
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In terms of service standards and quality, the contracting process presents managers of provider 
units with a major contradiction. On the one hand, accessibility, equity and social acceptability 
constitute three dimensions of quality against which a provider unit may be assessed (see Chapter Two, p. 
22, above), but which may, on the other hand, be impossible to realise within the new contiactual 
relationship. The various purchasing organizations are, for example, likely to have different priorities for 
the purchase of services and thus, levels of accessibility for tiieir patients may also be difierent. Hence, 
though third party purchasing organizations may be satisfied with the contractual elements of service 
delivery, the primary customer may not consider service provision to be either equitable or socially 
acceptable. Moreover, though the primary care giver can justify such anomalies on bureaucratic grounds, 
that is, that it is not his or her responsibilify, they cannot justify this position on ethical grounds (BMA, 
1993) since the opportunity cost of variations in accessibility that are created through the contracmal 
process may have an adverse effect on the health status of patients whose tieatment is delayed and, as 
Lembcke (1956) argued, standards should be uniform regardless of the status of the doctor or the patient. 
In short, the contractual relationship between purchaser and provider may generate conflict at the 
meso-level between managers and clinicians on the basis of quality precisely at a point in time when 
management are required to display a commitment to, and provide leadership and direction in pursuit of, 
continuous quality improvement. Indeed, while there are stiong arguments for change in the way health 
care is organized and delivered, it is possible that some of the issues the reforms are designed to address 
merely reappear in a different guise. That is, they may be transformed from organizational, management 
and resource issues into contiactual process related problems. 
Nevertheless, the separation of purchasers and providers, together with the patient centred focus 
of the reforms, have also resulted in major organizational change at the meso-level of the health service. 
Individual patients, often regarded as mere beneficiaries of the service in the past, are now considered as 
customers by provider organizations who thus have an explicit obligation to ensure tiiat quality, in all its 
dimensions, is an inherent feature of service delivery (Ellis, 1994). Consequentiy, new Clinical 
Directorate structures are now commonplace in provider units and are designed to effect greater 
responsibility and accountability for service quality and standards (see Figure 11, below). These macro 
and meso-level changes have however, further practical and theoretical implications for the management 
and delivery of health care. 
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On the one hand, macro-level changes have resulted in a complex and contradictor)' 
accountability matrix for provider organizations which, at the meso-level, can be considered, from a 
sociological perspective, to represent a major structural constiaint for health service management. A 
hospital is, for example, accountable to the patient as the primary custonier, to the state as the major 
budget-holder, to purchasing organizations as third party financiers, to the local community as the 
collective beneficiaries of the service and to employees as primary care givers. 
On the other hand, the economic realities of the new arrangements may have limited the options 
for meso-level re-organization because of the predominance of financial control as provider related 
management criterion of success within the contractual process: financial issues in health care are resource 
issues and "...RM [Resource Management] is about organization." (Buxton, Packwood and Keen, 1989, p. 
46) Indeed, the primary cause of the failure of 'management budgeting', the predecessor to RM, was the 
absence of a formal organizational structure that ensured managerial involvement by clinical staff in order 
to facilitate "...real output measurement against clearly stated management objectives" (my emphasis, from 
the Griffiths Enquiry, quoted in Akehurst and Drummond, 1989, p. 72). Consequentiy, the wide-spread 
adoption of Clinical Directorate structures based on traditional medical specialties, though effecting a 
solution for financial and resource accountabilify, may represent a practical barrier to meaningfiil qualify 
improvement since it merely reinforces the functional, 'management by objectives' model of healtii care 
(see Figure I I ) and does littie to facilitate continuous improvement in the co-ordination of services or 
processes. 
Hence, the outcome of meso-level re-organization might be to isolate medical audit activities 
while exacerbating the very problems that the Total Qualify Management initiative is designed to address 
since, as Figure 11 illustrates, responsibility for the co-ordination of the work of what often amounts to 
several thousand employees is invested in a relatively small number of people who are organizationally 
grouped at a point in the hierarchy several tiers above the level of direct patient care or service deliver>'. 
In short, the meso-level organization of the health care system may prove to be inconsistent with its 
overall strategic direction, but is certainly inconsistent with the stated intention of government policy 
which states that die delivery of health care will be improved by establishing "...an organization in which 
those who are actiially providing the services are also responsible for day-to-day decisions about 
operational matters" (Working for Patients, DoH, 1989a, quoted in Wall, 1993, p. 139). 
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Although intra-fiinctional process co-ordination is facilitated within a clinical directorate or other 
hierarchical structure (see, Figure 6, p. 3 2, above), and while a measure of cross functional process co-
ordination is possible at middle management level (Figure 7, p. 34, above), there is no formal mechanism 
for co-ordinating inter-functional processes at the point of service delivery. This is not however, to say 
that provider units are totally devoid of inter-functional co-ordinating mechanisms. Control of infection, 
drug utilization, blood product and safety reviews for example, are co-ordinated through a hospital's 
committee structure. Nevertheless, reporting arrangements for such committees usually reflect, indeed 
may account for the reification of the authority and responsibility relationships depicted in the formal 
organization, relationships that have been described as the representation of archaic hospital 
organizational structures that are primarily responsible for much of the inefficiency within health care 
provider units (Lathrop, 1993). This argument is illustrated at Figure 12 which shows, on the one hand, 
the direction and scope of some fimctional-based inputs into an admission process and, on the other, tlie 
task-oriented activities that contribute to overall process performance. 
In short, while inputs tend to be controlled and managed independentiy, co-ordination of process 
throughputs is largely left to benefits or vices of the informal organization. Consequenfly, there is a lack 
of organizational awareness of process performance or capacity while patients, having no insights into 
process performance, can only manifest their satisfaction, or otherwise, in terms of their experience of 
what are usually visible process outputs such as waiting times, environment or staff attitudes. These latter 
issues thus become the focal point of quality improvement activities which tend, therefore, to address the 
manifestation of the problem rather than tackling its cause - an anomaly that may result, not from the lack 
of method or measurement skills, but from the absence of an organizational structure that is consistent 
with the philosophy of putting the patient first. Indeed, in a survey of fifteen health autiiorities, Carr-Hill 
and Dalley (1993) found that: 
...providers have been preoccupied with the financial implications of the reforms, 
rather than with improving their quality-assurance systems....[there was] little co-
ordination of [quality improvement] activities and little thoroughgoing strategic 
planning for quality.... Accurate description and monitoring of what goes on in health 
care is lacking. Without this, quality assurance is nonsense. The tendency to 
introduce measurement systems based on no conceptual framework and only flimsy 
evidence only worsens the problem of developing a robust quality-assurance strategy. 
Significantly, a recent survey has shown that patient satisfaction with certain aspects of hospital based 
services actually declined between 1989 and 1993 (National Consumer Council, 1993). 
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It follows that NHS provider re-organization has largely been shaped by the external context and 
priorities of macro-level changes in the distribution, if not the source, of fiinding for UK heaJth care. The 
resultant effect on the meso-level formal organization, rather than decentralization and devolution, has 
been re-centralization through a process of "...departmentalization by function", and delegation to a new 
breed of clinical and non-clinical general managers who may, nevertheless, become functional specialists 
with limited vision and who may therefore, further constrain effective co-ordination (La Monica, 1990, p. 
479). In brief, the meso-level of the NHS has effectively retained a form of mechanistic organization that, 
though suitable in times of stability, is distinctly ineffective during a period of major change (Gibson, et. 
al., 1991; Burns and Stalker, Op. cit.). Against this background, it is relevant to consider the significance 
of the informal organization or, after Litterer (1965), of voluntary co-ordination of qualit)' issues. Noting 
the complexities of modern health care provider units, Georgopoulos and Mann (1962, pp. 57-58) describe 
the importance of the informal organization by stating that the "...hospital is dependent...upon the 
motivations and voluntary, informal adjustments of its members for the attainment and maintenance of 
good co-ordination." Moreover, the total interdependence of the formal and informal organization is 
recognized by Blau and Scott (1962, p. 6) who argue that: 
It is impossible to understand the nature of the formal organization without 
investigating the networks of informal relations and the unofficial norms as well as 
the formal hierarchy of authority and the official body of rules, since the formally 
instituted and the informally emerging patterns are inextricably intertwined 
Hence, the internal environmental context of health care provider units can be said to comprise 
both the formal and informal organizations, but while the former governs the activities of individuals, the 
latter is characterized by their specific behaviours, often governed by informal group values, in response to 
the inadequacies of formal structures. Thus, if, as argued above, the formal structure is indeed inadequate 
for co-ordinating continuous quality improvement, then an understanding of the informal organization of 
the NHS is central to any assessment of quality initiatives such as Medical Audit and Total Quality 
Management. Essentially, this means that the impact of these new policies can only be fully explained by 
examining the interaction of human agency with the new meso-level environmental context of tlie NHS. 
Nevertheless, the informal organization also has form; a structure, often complex and based on status, but 
which includes a leadership role (Rakich, et. al.. Op. cit., pp. 226-7), and in the NHS, is strongly 
influenced by professional ethics. 
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Yet, in the UK, medical hegemony within provider units has been considerably challenged in two 
major respects. First, by general management, with the result that medical staff now underestimate "...the 
power of their leadership role, and the extent to which other staff feel leaderless when doctors fail to give 
direction" (Potter, et. o/., 1994). Second, as a result of the transition from an illness orientated, 
institutionalized system of acute inpatient care, to a preventative service based on sub-acute, outpatient 
care located within the community. Consequently, the values associated with the perceived stability of the 
former system tend to be undermined, and traditional authority, both formal and informal, within provider 
organizations may be brought into question (Koch and Fairly, 1993). 
It follows, that when professional ethics and, ipso facto, associated group values, withstand the 
challenges posed by structural and meso-level organizational change, then the orientation and dynamics of 
the informal organization may become alienated from, and prove dysfunctional for, the strategic direction 
of the new provider units. This not to say that the clinical professions and health service managers are 
necessarily pursuing different goals since they share the common purpose of providing the best possible 
care for their patients. But, when this purpose is translated into a local agenda for action, conflict can 
occur (Kennerley, 1992). 
In short, if the agenda for action at local level is considered to be inconsistent with professional 
ethics or if the national policy agenda is perceived to be incompatible with the retention of the 
fundamental principles of health care delivery in the UK, then there is considerable potential for meso-
level conflict over policy implementation. Moreover, though the NHS has been radically re-organized, 
the medical profession, the traditional bastion of authority within health care organizations, has not. 
Thus, 'state sanctioned self-regulation' remains a definitive characteristic of the profession, but may be 
inconsistent with the concepts of 'managed care' and 'internal market competition'. 
Similarly, in spite of some recent debate "...non-clinical managers have no formally stated ethical 
code or guidelines. How they exercise their responsibilities for the collective provision of care is far from 
clear" (Warner and Evans, 1993, p. 20). Hence, there is fiirther potential for policy implementation 
conflict based upon the persistence, on the one hand, of established ethics in medicine and, on the other, 
the absence of a similar type of decision making base for managers. 
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In sum, the combined effects of macro-level change, the re-organization of provider units and the 
redefinition of their role, together with the absence of a common ethical basis for meso-level decision 
making, may undermine the impact of both new organizational structures and the traditional role of 
informal leaders. The prospect for continuous improvement in the quality of UK health care might 
therefore, be correspondingly weakened because, at the provider level, the concept of Total Qualit)' 
Management is based on the premise of integrated collaboration between all members of the organization. 
The medical audit initiative is, on the other hand, by definition, the preserve of the medical profession and 
may thus become an isolated activity that contributes little, relative to its resource allocation, to the overall 
quality mission of a hospital provider unit. 
CHAPTER F I V E 
METHODOLOGY 
Quality has become a central issue in both policy and practice in UK health care and is inextricably linked 
to organizational and technical developments within the NHS. These are aimed at improving 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and include the re-organization of management structures in 
hospital provider units, the creation of a formal contractual process for the purchase and provision of 
health care, the development of comprehensive management information systems (MIS), and the 
application of quality management methods and techniques. However, as Hunter (1990, pp. 213-254) 
notes, many of these changes are based on theories derived from industrial management experience and 
thus fail to: 
...appreciate sufficiently the NHS's power structure, the capacity of groups to bargain 
and influence (notably sections of the medical profession), and the development of 
policy at the front-line level rather than solely at higher levels. 
Here, the conceptual adequacy of recent NHS reforms is questioned in relation to the potential for 
the health care professions to significantly alter intended policy outcomes. Moreover, though the aims of 
the reforms are largely technical and involve the development of new methods for assessing and 
improving performance, the most significant challenge is to establish new social processes through which 
these aims can be achieved (Hunter, Ibid.; Maxwell and Evans, 1984). It follows that, for health service 
policy makers and planners, an understanding of internal organizational dynamics is essential and, for 
sociology, there is a largely unfulfilled requirement for research that contributes towards this 
understanding (Hunter, Op. cit.; Cox, 1991; Jefferys, 1991). Nevertheless, since this research thesis 
concerns issues of quality in health care there is an additional need for a micro-level understanding of 
quality improvement methods and techniques. Hence, the overall research strategy can be said to 
combine a meso-level focus on the social system within hospital provider units with a micro-level 
consideration of the quality management technical system. The methodological implications of this 
strategy are twofold. First, there is a need to gain a comprehensive knowledge of quality methods, 
techniques and issues in health care. Second, in order to assess the conceptual adequacy of qualit)' related 
policy initiatives it is necessary to place them in the context of other changes and to acquire evidence 
about changing social relationships and about how such change is achieved. 
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In these latter respects, although some background information was derived from a review of the 
literature, an ethnographic approach was considered most appropriate for gaining first-hand knowledge 
about quality issues and for the identification of the 'what' and the 'how' of social change in hospital 
provider units. Yet, it is important at the outset to note potential sources of bias and, in this respect, the 
choice of method was also influenced by the author's occupational immersion within the health care 
system in general, and with close vocational proximity to health care quality issues in particular. In 
addition, after PoUitt et. al. (1990), the ethnographic approach is defined here as the tradition of obtaining 
data through observation and interaction with those who are centrally involved with the object of the 
study. However, given that the researcher was effectively an observing participant, required to actively 
intervene in, and observe the resulting impact on, some of the processes under investigation, then elements 
of the thesis may be considered to warrant the label action research ( Gummesson, 1991; Brymen, 1989). 
Nonetheless, in spite of its long history as a constructive social science research approach, 
ethnography continues to attract criticism on the grounds that it lacks the rigour and objectivitj' of 
scientific analysis and that its findings are thus of questionable validity (Hammersley, 1990; PoUitt et. al.. 
Op. cit.; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). Such criticism is part of a wider debate between exponents 
of positivist and qualitative methods, but may also reflect a measure of acceptance, by some scholars, of 
the virtues of a neo-classical economic variant of the positivist approach and of the inherent bias, in public 
institutions, against qualitative research into policy issues that are considered to be politically sensitive 
(Hunter, Op. cit.; Pollitt et al., Op. cit.). Jefferys for example, (Op. cit., pp. 229-230), argues that: 
...it is likely that sociologists will only be able to make a contribution [to health policy 
research] if they ally themselves with epidemiologists, statisticians, health economists, 
geographers, social psychologists and business-study analysts....a sociological 
perspective may only be feasible in institutional settings dominated by health service 
managers, medical practitioners or proponents of other disciplines....[and] sociologists 
should accept it and use their energies in trying to ensure that their own contribution 
makes a significant impact on the research undertaken, even if it cannot permeate it 
to any great extent. 
This argument is based on the assumption that the government agenda for health research will be limited 
to projects that are amenable to the application of quantitative methods, but the author does acknowledge a 
broader role for 'classical sociology' with regard to the determinants of social processes and the 
relationship between the "...organs of state authority" {Ibid., p. 231) and health care providers -
recognition, perhaps, that such issues are not amenable to quantitative measurement. 
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In more general terms, a positivist approach to health care policy issues is limited in three major 
respects, viz, philosophical, methodological and practical. Although positi\'ism reached its zenith in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, its philosophical roots can be traced to Rene Descartes, (1596-1650), 
who argued that the world was essentially mechanistic and, in his Discourse on Method (1637) and 
Meditations (1641), developed philosophical theories that provided a mathematical basis for the extension 
of all areas of knowledge. The impact on medicine for example, was to establish a mind-body dualism in 
which the corporeal or material part of the individual was considered the appropriate locus for the 
investigation of disease. The mind, on the other hand, was considered incorporeal or immaterial to the 
diagnostic process and the body, as Hart (1985, p. 14) argues, was "...handed over to [a] new positivist 
science." Subsequently, the scientific method permeated and has come to underpin a discipline that 
emerged from a plurality of non-scientific healing systems based on combinations of mythology', magic, 
chemistry and both organic and mechanistic theories of anatomy and physiology - (for a more complete 
discussion, see Stacey, 1988, Ch 3., especially). The positivist paradigm gives epistemological priority to 
directly observable phenomena that can be analysed to provide evidence of relationships between variables 
and thus provides a high degree of statistical probabihty that such research based findings constitute 
universally acceptable laws (Hammersley and Atkinson, Op. cit.). However, such methods cannot proxide 
insights into the variety of meanings applied to policy issues by social actors within a health care 
organization since different groups may apply interpretations that reflect professional interests rather than 
policy intentions. Moreover, it is rarely possible, in practical terms, to subject policy related issues to the 
experimental designs that are characteristic of both classical positivist. and neo-classical economic 
research. 
However, it is also difficult to establish the validity of ethnographic studies. On one hand, 
establishing confidence in the extent to which specific data collection techniques can be attributed with 
producing particular results is a central ethnographic problem, even though the external validity of the 
research findings may, on the other hand, prove generally applicable (Pollitt et al., Op. cit.). Part of this 
difficulty involves the interpretation data, but the sheer scale of potentially useful information and the 
process of selection are also salient factors. Although the focus of this research limits consideration to 
two new policy initiatives, it does so at a time when the health care environment is ex-periencing other 
unprecedented changes, and it is therefore possible that the behaviour of organizational members will 
reflect their perception of the sum rather than specific aspects of these changes. 
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Consequently, the internal validity of qualitative research can be questioned on the grounds tliat 
the presence of the researcher and the methods employed may influence, or fail to capture, the context of 
the study. Research reliability is however, often taken to mean the extent to which there is consistency in 
terms of measurement, but, in this sense, is considered more appropriate to quantitative conceptualisations 
than to the methodological framework employed in ethnographic studies (Hammersley, Op. cit). This is 
not to say that reliability is irrelevant, but to accept that human behaviour carmot, on ethical and practical 
grounds, be subject to the type of controlled experimentation that is characteristic of physical science. In 
addition, from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective, it can be argued that the researcher is 
inextricably present in social reality by virtue of the subjective judgements that are made with regard to 
research design and analysis. In effect, the question of reliability in ethnography is pursued through the 
adaptation of the research focus to what respondents regard as significant, and interpretation can be aided 
by the application of data collection methods that may be used both for exploration and confirmation. 
With regard to external validity on the other hand, Hammersley, {Op. cit., p. 56), argues that the 
function of ethnography is "...to produce knowledge that is of public relevance." Here, it is the findings of 
ethnographic research, based on inferences drawn from interpretations, that may be questionable insofar as 
they represent a plausible and credible account of the phenomena under investigation (Haitmiersley, Op. 
cit.). Plausibility, can be determined on the basis of existing knowledge, but where evidence is considered 
implausible then the researcher must provide information about the conduct of the research that is 
sufficient to enable his audience to make judgements about the credibility of the findings. For these 
reasons it is important to discuss the limitations of the data gathering techniques employed during the 
study, and to consider the contextual status of the researcher. Four major sources of data were utilized 
during the study. First, secondary literature provided much of the background information for health care 
quality issues and organizational change in the NHS. Second, documentary sources generated within the 
health care system provided data that were used for investigating the environmental context of NHS 
provider units. Third, primary sources were exploited through a variety of techniques that included 
participant, non-participant and structured observation and semi-structured interviews - techniques that 
provided material for investigating the social system within hospitals. Third, applied data became 
available through a process of interaction between the researcher and colleagues concerned with the 
implementation of quality management systems and thus provided a means of evaluating the technical 
adequacy of health care quality management systems. 
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Participant observation presupposes an extended period of access to the context of the 
investigadon and may be defined as a means of providing the researcher with first hand knowledge of 
social behaviour within that context. Though centrally concerned with the observation of people during 
the normal course of their work, participant observation also involves listening, both to individual 
commentators and to group discussion. In policy and organizational smdies, the approach has the 
advantage of flexibility, enabling the researcher to identify significant topics and themes that are revealed, 
implicitly or explicitly, through the observation of individual and collective behaviours set within the 
process of organizational events. Moreover, topics and themes thus identified are likely to be devoid of 
the reality distortion that can be created tin-ough the use of experimental methods and subsequent 
interpretation can be partiy said to contain a measure of explanation derived from meanings attributable to 
organizational members (Pollitt et. al.. Op. cit.; Bryman, 1989). Hence, policy induced organizational 
change within a health care setting, a setting that Sti-auss et. al. (1963) reported to be in a constant state of 
flux due to the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of the social order, is particularly suitable for the 
application of participant observation. Several difficulties can be associated with this approach however, 
in terms of accessibility, data collection and analysis. 
The level of accessibility gained during most of this research was commensurate with the Type 1 
classification devised by Bryman {Op. cit., pp. 151-161). Here, the researcher is an organizational 
member and, in this study, was a full observer with a mandate to engage directiy in issues that provided 
the research focus. However, hospitals are large, multi-professional settings, and full access does not 
automatically follow from 'role access'. In health care, routine access to some activities, tiie tieatiuent and 
care of patients for example, may be considered unethical on the grounds of privacy and confidentialit}', or 
would be technically unsafe, in theatre for example, where non-essential presence could present the risk of 
cross-infection or other avoidable hazards. Neither is access to tiie confidence of professional groups an 
automatic extension of full observer stams, but is something that is dependent upon the extent to which the 
researcher can establish personal credibility. In short, though full observer statiis may be granted, there 
can be occasions when covert observation is necessary, and situations where the researcher occupies an 
indirect role and thus, must either assume the status of a Type 2 semi-participant, Type 3 interviewer or, 
when in other health care units, a Type 4 multi-site observer after Bryman (Op. cit.). These differences in 
levels of participation have, as Bryman {Op. cit., p. 151) further notes, "...implications.. .for the kind of 
data that are acquired" and for its collection and analysis. 
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Although participant observation allows the researcher to explore primary sources, the nature of 
data and its mode of collection are clearly dependent upon the level of participation enjoyed at various 
points in the study. Full observation of the kind associated with the Type 1 classification is, for example, 
heavily dependent on the construction of field notes that need to be categorized, cross-referenced and 
periodically re-categorized as their significance emerges during the course of tiie research. This kind of 
data tends to be highly detailed, but, where the researcher pursues a dual role as an employee, it is rarely 
possible to construct a record of events at the time of observation. 
Indirect observation on the other hand, of the kind associated with Type 2 semi or non-participant 
status, is common in three stages of institution-based health care research, viz, during the early period of 
organizational involvement when the researcher may suffer a degree of disorientation, in sitiaations where 
the absence of technical skills constrain a peripheral role, and in Type 4 situations where off-site 
institutions provide the research setting. Here, not only is there an opportunitj' for simultaneous 
observation and recording, but also for an element of preliminary analysis through the immediate 
identification of themes and topics, or the recognition of associations between the data and issues revealed 
earlier in the study. This should not however, deflect the researcher from conducting a more rigorous 
analysis at a later date. 
Alternatively, the structured, semi-structured or unstructured interview provides the bases for the 
Type 3 level of participation. In this study, the use of the structured interview was avoided on tiie grounds 
that it might obscure pertinent data if the significance of some issues did not become fiilly apparent until 
late into the research process - a common feature of qualitative studies (Bryman, Op. cit ). Semi and 
unstructured interviews were employed, but the latter were used primarily in an exploratory context, and 
the former mainly for confirmation. Both methods frequentiy provided new data however, and thus, 
created the need for a cyclical element in the framework used for data processing (see Figure 13., 
overieaf). This framework includes observation, reflection, analysis, interpretation and confirmation, and 
its use illustrates a rejection of the view that field notes can be freated as "...unproblematic 
sociological...data" (Atkinson, 1992, p. 17). But it also presupposes an acceptance tiiat tiie research 
findings represent a reconstioiction of 'reality' that is limited both by what was observed and by tiie 
researcher's interpretations conveyed within the context of existing knowledge and established theoretical 
paradigms. 
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While it is argued above that the observation and interpretation of human behaviour does not 
easily lend itself to quantitative methods, a form of structured observation was developed for use in the 
later stages of the research process. Though similar to Bryman's Type 2 classification in terms of the 
indirect or non-participant proximity of the researcher, structured or systematic observation involves the 
construction of a record of events or responses within a framework of predetermined issues (Bryman, Op. 
cit., Ch. 8). Exercises were conducted during three TQM educational seminars in a hospital provider uiut 
and centred on gaining respondents views on three issues. First, on common health care quality problems 
that were essentially social in character; second, on problems within the technical system; and third, on 
those issues that might act as a barrier against the successful implementation of TQM in a health care 
setting. Although the exercises were designed by the researcher, the seminars were conducted by external 
consultants and thus, the status of the researcher may be considered to be that of a non-participant. For 
the duration of the seminars, respondents were grouped into six teams of eight and, on each occasion, were 
organized on a multi-disciplinary basis that included medical, nursing, clerical, managerial, engineering 
and both clinical and non-clinical support staff. In order to increase the probability of objective 
responses, the selection of topics was constrained only by a requirement for group consensus. Moreover, 
in an attempt to minimize the potential for distortion caused by the presence of the observer, and to obtain 
meaningfiil data, the exercises were conducted on the last of the three days of the seminars when it was 
considered more likely that participants would be familiar with TQM concepts, and less likely to be 
influenced by the peripheral presence of the observer. Finally, the issues selected for the investigative 
framework described above were developed from qualitative data collected earlier in the study and were 
thus considered to provide a valid basis upon which the informed views of respondents could be obtained. 
Nonetheless, these structured observation exercises can be considered to represent action research 
projects, sometimes termed applied or participative research after Whyte (1984), that were conducted on 
behalf of the organization in which the researcher was an employed member. The resultant data thus 
proved useful in practical terms, that is for the development of a TQM implementation strateg}' and 
forward plan, but also provided both confirmatory evidence in respect of other data and an opportunity for 
further analysis and interpretation. Data confirmed, for example, the existence of a correlation between 
certain themes and distinct professional groups and contributed to the interpretation of the significance of 
such themes by revealing something of the extent of inter-professional conflict, and consensus, over the 
direction, priorities and constraints for developing TQM in a health care setting. 
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Documentary evidence provided a second source of data, but should be distinguished between tiie 
secondary literature used as a basis for background information and primary material, written at the time 
of the research, that emanated from within the health care system. In this latter respect, the health care 
system should be taken, in the broadest sense, to mean the sum of governmental, organizational and 
professional institutions concerned with the delivery of health care. Documentation obtained from these 
sources thus included official macro-level publications, letters and circulars; meso-level business plans, 
operational policies and documents relating to the design of both organizational structures and technical 
systems; and journal articles that are best described as secondary material on the grounds that there may 
be a significant time lag between submission, acceptance and publication. 
On the one hand, consideration of secondary literature allowed for a critical review of the 
adequacy of the technical systems being developed in support of quality management in health care arid 
may be considered constructive insofar as this resulted in the identification of questions and issues that 
provided both a preliminary investigative framework and a basis for applied research at a later point in the 
study. Moreover, a critical review of the implications of both structural and organizational change within 
the NHS helped to establish the appropriateness of questioning the concepmal adequacy of these aspects of 
the reforms in terms of their relationship to actual or proposed changes in the technical system. 
The analysis of documents originating from within the health care system on the otiier hand, also 
proved advantageous. Official papers for example, set out the strategic direction and stated intentions of 
policy initiatives; organizational documentation reveals something of meso-level responses to the latter; 
and articles in journals illustrate professional concerns relating to issues raised in or by the former two 
sources. Journal articles can also be used both for the confirmation of data derived from obser\'ation and 
interviews, or to provide additional focal points for the research. Furthermore, documentary sources 
avoid the potential for various types of respondent bias that are often associated with observation and 
interview methods, may also illustrate the continuity of themes over time, and can provide tiie researcher 
with information about the professional views of elite figures who may otherwise be inaccessible (Bryman, 
Op. cit., p. 197). Nevertheless, documentary sources of the kind referred to above are rarely constructed 
for the benefit of subsequent research projects and thus, like many otiier forms of written and oral 
testimony, are subject to the limitations of the researchers interpretative framework. 
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The interpretation of any form of data presupposes either the acceptance of the truth of the data or 
the application of a method for determining its validity (Gottschalk et. al., in Bryman, Op. cit., p. 198). 
In the context of the documentary evidence explored in this study however, it is more appropriate to ask 
whether such sources displayed, or were intended to display, the whole truth. Here, the question of 
hidden agenda becomes central to the process of interpretation and, in the case of NHS policy statements 
and related meso-level responses, can be pardy identified by discussing their practical implications and 
comparing these with stated policy objectives. Yet, it is important to consider that even when 
contradictions between intentions and outcomes can be inferred, this may have more to do with a lack of 
perception on the part of policy makers and NHS managers than with any deliberate attempt to mislead. 
However, where anomalies between policy and practice are exposed early in the implementation process, it 
is possible to detect an awareness of these in the form of new directives designed to overcome such 
discrepancies. Alternatively, when comparing responses to policies between different institutions it is 
necessary to be aware that local circumstances can lead to divergent outcomes and may not therefore be 
attributable to ambiguous or inadequate policy statements - or more briefly, to recognise "...that the unit of 
analysis [may not be] identical (Bryman, Ibid.). Hence the importance of site-specific observation and 
analysis and the relationship between qualitative methods and documentary evidence. Nevertheless, it 
follows that unintended consequences of health care policy initiatives might create the potential for 
politico-ideological exploitation, particularly when stated policy objectives are not fully realised. 
Interpreting qualitative data also presents difficulties due to the dependence on observation and 
oral testimony. However, the use of more than one data source has already been mentioned as a device 
that facilitates cross-validation and is consistent with the concept of triangulation which is described as a 
means of relating "...different sorts of data in such a way as to counteract various possible threats to tlie 
validity of [the] analysis" (Hammersley and Atkinson, Op. cit., p. 199). In addition, a form of respondent 
validation was employed whereby feedback was obtained via a series of seminars, lecmres and 
presentations based on preliminary research findings, sometimes including the distribution of written 
material, but always followed by individual or group discussion. Though conducted or delivered by the 
author within health care settings, these exercises were performed in the capacity of an employee and thus, 
the status of the observer during these events can be considered to be covert. Nevertheless, since the 
content was topical, participation proved to be illuminating, sometimes contentious, but always rewarding 
since the purpose was to seek validation of events rather than agreement on inferences made about events. 
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Action research provided a further source of 'applied' data, but establishing the validity and 
reliability of the results of such research presents different types of difficulty. Data can be regarded as 
valid insofar as it is based on a consensus of those involved in its production. Reliability on the other 
hand, may be tested through the application and evaluation of the results within the research setting, but 
only to the degree that time permits since, in the complex world of health care, it may take several years to 
establish a causal link between the application of quality management methods and improvements in 
health care or organizational outcomes. Nevertheless, action research projects provided data that were 
derived from the adaptation and refinement of industrial or business quality management techniques to 
health care settings. This work revealed where unmodified techniques were either limited or inadequate 
and therefore contributed to the development of more appropriate designs. Yet, the results were not 
merely of practical or technical significance, but also assisted in the identification, through covert 
observation, of some of the social characteristics of health care organizations that significantiy impact on 
the design or implementation of quality management systems. 
Finally, because of the dearth of published material on meso-level health care organizational or 
policy research (Pollitt et. al., Op. cit., p. 188; Hunter, Op. cit., pp. 214-215) and since different types of 
data have implications for the style used to present the results of stirdies (Newby, 1977), consideration was 
given to the form of narrative to be used for the presentation of the research findings. In short, despite 
heavy reliance on data collection through observation, a first person form of narrative was rejected as 
inappropriate on the following grounds. First, on methodological grounds: though the development of a 
framework for data processing provided a structiu-ed and systematic approach to data analysis, 
confirmation and interpretation (Figure 13, above) this should not be taken to infer that data collection 
was a neat or tidy process. In acttiality, the nature of the research setting often constrained retrospective 
note-making some hours after the observation of events and hence, verbatim tianscription was rarely 
attempted. Second, on epistemological grounds since it was accepted, at the outset, that the presence of 
the researcher was part of, and party to, the re-construction of reality in tiie social arena under 
investigation. Third, on the grounds that the level of analysis and central aims of tiie research did not 
lend themselves to an intimate style of reporting. Fourth, on the premise that the intimate fonn of a first 
person narrative would not fulfil the research expectations, created by the level of analysis and study aims, 
of intended and potential readers. A more conventional form of interpretation combined v\'ith sociological 
analysis, followed by discussion, was thus considered more suitable. 
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In sum, the research design and research methods should be regarded as distinct (Bryman, Op. 
cit., p. 28). Although an ethnographic approach was selected as the basis for the overall study design, it 
involved, ultimately, the application of a variety of research methods that were not clearly identified at the 
outset. Moreover, potential data sources and opportunities for their exploitation did not become flilly 
evident until after the fieldwork had begun and thus, "...such [ethnographic] research...cannot be fully 
designed in the pre-fieldwork phase" (Hammersley and Atkinson, Op. cit., p. 28). For these reasons the 
importance of developing a structiired analytical framework can be regarded as more, rather than less, 
important and thus provides a justification for the inclusion, above, of discussions about the precise 
application of several methods of data collection and verification. Nevertheless, further consideration will 
be given to the problems and promise of the research strategy following the presentation of die research 
findings. 
CHAPTER SIX 
PROXIMITY WITHOUT POWER: THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENT OF HOSPITAL PROVIDER UNITS 
Although recent research suggests that only modest improvements in NHS performance have resulted 
from the 1991 reforms (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994), the environment within which hospital care is 
provided has undergone, and is likely to be subject to further profound change. Contributory factors 
include the development of larger purchasing organizations and more sophisticated contractual processes, 
a substantial shift towards primary and community based care, an expansion of the role of general 
management, and proposals for new accountability arrangements that will follow the planned dissolution 
of the eight remaining Regional Health Authorities (ElHA's) and their replacement, in 1996, by Regional 
Offices (RO's) of the National Health Service Management Executive (NHSME). While most of these 
changes can be considered structurally external to provider units, the resultant impact on the internal 
organization and fiinctioning of hospitals, on their relationship with other health care institutions, and on 
the morale of managers, clinicians and other staff, has been both complex and considerable. 
The pragmatic consensus between purchasers and providers that corresponded with the 
uncertainty of the early years of the reforms has given way to a conflict between the market-place ethos of 
the latter and the public service ethos of the former (May, 1994; Tremblay and Wall, 1994). In this early 
period, primary importance was given to the development of NHS trusts and General Practice (GP) 
fundholders while District Health Authority (DHA) and Family Health Service Autiiorit}' (FHSA) 
purchasers were advised to maintain the status quo with existing provider units. By 1993 however, both 
governmental and state agencies were advocating a stronger role for purchasers who, in a ministerial 
address to the National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT), were described as the 
pipers who 'must call the tune', a view endorsed following a subsequent recommendation for stiengthening 
the purchasing role by merging DHAs and FHSAs (Audit Commission, 1993a; 1993b). Though 
economies of scale provide a rationale for this recommendation on the grounds that fragmented 
purchasing can raise unit costs if others contract for similar services elsewhere, this has lead to a narrow 
interpretation of health care improvement expressed solely in terms of greater throughput (Audit 
Commission, 1994a). Such an interpretation thus confuses efficiency with effectiveness and has led to a 
revised emphasis on the role of NHS trusts in developing long-term health care planning {Ibid.). 
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This ambiguity in the thrust of central pohcy may indicate an element of frustration, with both 
purchaser and provider performance, by a government entering the final two years of its current term of 
office. In a written answer to a Parhamentary question it was revealed that almost frf3ty percent of NHS 
trusts had failed to reach at least one of their financial targets in 1992/3 (Hansard, col. 541w, 20 April 
1994). However, such failures are considered to be partly due to ineffective hospital management, 
including initiafives such as TQM that are designed to involve all staff in the change process, and partly 
because "...providers....[are] left at the mercy of last-minute changes of direction by purchasers" (Audit 
Commission, 1994, p. 11). Yet, the complexity of the contractual process, the relative risks associated 
with alternative purchasing strategies, and the lack of pertinent data may provide a more plausible 
explanation both for provider management paralysis and purchaser indecision. 
At the outset of the reforms, most DHAs, following official guidance (NHSME, 1989; 1990), 
opted for simple block contracts based on the historical provision for their population, though some fiinds 
were reserved for extra-contractual referrals (ECRs) - referrals by non-fimdholding GPs to providers with 
whom the responsible purchasing authority has no contract or for non-specified services. For providers, 
block contracts minimise potential disruption to existing services, but carry the risk that the provider will 
bear the costs of increased activity. Consequentiy, many providers negotiated more sophisticated 
combinations of block and cost-per-case contracts, though large cost-per-case contiacts are unusual 
because they create incentives for providers to complete more episodes since the financial risk is borne by 
the purchaser. Nevertheless, the sophistication of the conti-actual process is not matched by tiiat of 
management information systems (MIS). Although such systems are under development in most provider 
units, many are based on departmental networks that do not link with order communications systems 
(OCS). An OCS is the component that processes requests and results for diagnostic tests between patient 
areas and clinical support services such as radiology, pharmacy and pathology; OCS also provide patient-
related data for costing and contract management, (see Figure 14, overleaf); and an OCS can significantly 
enhance the quality function in provider units. The computerised ordering of drugs for example, reduces 
transcription errors and 'on-line' information about drug interactions or doses facilitates improved clinical 
decision making among medical and nursing staff (Johnston et al., 1994). Other studies in the USA 
have indicated that many diagnostic tests are overused or are often inappropriate and therefore represent 
non-value added costs that can be reduced by adherence to computer-based clinical protocols (Eisenberg 
et. al., 1977; Tierney et al., 1988). 
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Furthermore, an OCS facilitates the development of meaningful quality systems than can monitor 
outcome indicators such as critical clinical incident rates, and measure process performance in terms of 
lengths or duration of stay for example. Nevertheless, though the management of both cost and quality in 
health care can be significantiy enhanced through the application of OCS, it is noteworthy that only 
thirteen per cent of UK provider units have implemented OCS (Thomas et al., 1994), and that cential 
funding for hospital MIS development ceased in April 1994. In short, while purchaser-provider social 
relations have largely been established through macro-level re-organization and the development of meso-
level contractiial communication mechanisms, the necessary technical support systems have not. In 
consequence, managers in both purchasing and provider organizations often find themselves discussing 
prices when "...they haven't got a clue about what things really cost" (a provider Chief Executive quoted in 
Crail, 1994, p. 16). It follows therefore, that because of the limitations of the information available for 
contractual negotiations, provider managers are constrained to place financial issues at the top of their 
agenda. Moreover, the limited fimds set aside for ECRs is neither consistent, between purchasers, nor 
sufficient to cover their cost because there is no clear definition of an E C R due to variations in contiacted 
service provision between different DHAs. In turn, this has two further significant consequences. First, 
it questions the principle of equitable accessibility, and second, it has resulted in increasing administiative 
costs (Maheswaran et. al., 1994). On the one hand, just as die NHS absorbed the inadequacies of the old 
system, recent reforms have inherited, and may have added to, inequalities in the distribution and 
availability of resources (Ham, 1993). Regional geographic and socio-economic inequalities that 
permeate the UK health care system (see Townsend and Davidson, 1988) may for example, be further 
exacerbated by local variation in services that are direct result of the new contractual process - though 
some have argued that the new arrangements merely reveal the true, heterogeneous, natiue of UK healtii 
care (Salter, 1994). On the other hand, the scale of cost-contiact related problems is only becoming 
apparent as more hospitals imdergo the transformation to tioist status and thus lose the protective umbrella 
formerly provided by DHAs which had a responsibility for maintaining the \'iabilit}' of tiieir directly 
managed units. The extension of the purchaser-provider concept has resulted in tiie removal of "...some of 
the old parochial loyalties" (Spurgeon, 1993, p. 121), and means tiiat the pragmatically necessary' high 
profile business orientation adopted by provider unit managers often conflicts with the public service ethos 
of their hospitals and with the ethics and professional standards to which their chnical staff owe 
allegiance. Hence, tiiere is often a credibility gap between what management say about quality and 
observable management activity. 
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In addition, the provider environment has been altered by advances in medical technologj', by 
revised assessments of health care needs by DHAs and by developments in primary and community-based 
care. Reductions in lengths of stay for example, and increases in day-case activities have been facilitated 
by the use of laparoscopic, microscopic and laser surgical techniques; purchaser re-assessment of priorities 
has led to the modification or closure of existing services; and specific fiinding is available for meeting the 
combined health and social care needs of the elderly, and of physically and mentally handicapped patients, 
within community settings (DHSS, 1988; DHSS, 1989b). Paradoxically therefore, many providers are 
experiencing greater throughput in core service activity while the demand for inpatient beds is in decline. 
Changes in fiinding primary care have also had, and may have fiuther impact on the provider 
environment. First, the creation of independent fundholding GPs has altered the power relationship 
between primary and secondary care with the result that, where a provider organization has contracts with 
several fimdholding practices, service provision has become asynmietrical in terms of accessibility or other 
dimensions of quality. In addition however, the formulae for calculating fundholding budgets for hospital 
referrals is based on GP in-patient activity levels during the two years prior to the year in question. Yet, 
since most fiindholders gave priority to clearing their waiting lists diuing the early years of the reforms, it 
is likely that their requirements will be much less than indicated by data that are two years old (Jones, 
1994). Thus, the financial position of provider units may be undermined if fimdholders do not generate 
anticipated activity levels. Almost inevitably therefore, some trusts will fail to meet their financial 
targets, and they may feel that their freedoms are being constrained "...for tiie benefit of increased GP 
powers and choice" (Cottam, 1994). 
The freedoms enjoyed by NHS trusts are also perceived to be threatened by the proposed NHS 
executive management structure. The NHSME will function as the 'headquarters of the NHS' and will 
assume responsibility for monitoring the performance of both purchasers and providers through eight 
Regional Offices, for strengthening the piuchasing fimction by promoting mergers between DHAs and 
FHSAs, for defining the rules of the internal market, and for allocating resources to health autiiorities, 
FHSAs and GP ftmdholders (DoH, 1992; DoH, 1993; NHSME, 1993a). ft is also reported that tite 
NHSME will support the development of guidelines for clinical practice - the subject of a recent Executive 
Letter (EL(94)74) - but, that in all otiier relevant respects, the new corporate management structure "...will 
not be involved in detailed operational matters" (DoH, 1992, Ibid.). 
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Although these latter proposals are not yet implemented, fom- major inferences can be made. 
First, the plaimed involvement of the 'centre' in resource issues suggests an acceptance that market 
mechanisms do not effect efficient resource allocation in UK health care. Second, that the inequity of the 
current fragmented purchasing system is also recognized. Third, that the inherent inequalities of the 
health care system, at least in terms of its inability to meet all demands, is to be formally recognized and 
reconciled through a contractual system based less on volume of activity and more on informed 
judgements, derived from clinical guidelines, about the effectiveness or otherwise of specific interventions. 
Finally, the state vv^ ould have assumed control, but would avoid responsibility for 'detailed operational 
matters', thereby leaving purchasers and providers in a position of proximity, to responsibility for service 
specification and delivery, but effectively without the power to determine either the size of the market, in 
terms of resource availability and allocation, or the mechanisms through which such resources will be 
distributed amongst their population. 
Irrespective of the outcomes of fiirther policy changes, there is broad recognition that rationing of 
health care has become an explicit topic on the public agenda as a result of purchaser-provider re-
organization (IHSM, 1994b). In addition, the development of clinical guidelines or protocols, an implicit 
fiinction of the medical audit initiative, is considered crucial not only for the development of MIS, but for 
effective local prioritization of service provision by establishing what are or are not considered to be 
effective medical interventions. Medical audit may thus be considered to be the stimulus for the revised 
role of provider units in long-term health care planning, but this presupposes the active participation of 
hospital based medical professionals in a process that might effect the local demise, or as Maynard (1994, 
p. 19) argues, the retention of their specialty. Audit would thus be transformed, from a catalytic concept 
designed to promote and sustain change in practitioner attimdes and practices, into a technical mechanism 
that provides data that may either facilitate effective commissioning of services, or inhibit the contractual 
process (Maynard, Ibid.). However, if medical audit develops primarily to facilitate the contractual 
process, then hospital boards will effectively make rationing decisions about the supply side of health care, 
but they will be bureaucratically rather than publicly accountable. Moreover, supra-regional, and possibly 
private sector specialist hospitals would likely fill the void left by any local non-provision, and purchaser 
and, ipso facto, patient choice would be fiirther limited while some issues about accessibility would be 
reduced to little more than economic arguments. 
70 
On the other hand, if medical audit is used as a defensive mechanism by the medical profession, 
then public confidence in the health service is likely to decline and "...fiiel the call for the next round of 
NHS disorganization" (Maynard, Ibid.). In short, given the proposed central-peripheral relationships 
mentioned above, the rhetoric about public consultation and choice will be substituted by increased 
bureaucratic determination of priorities effected through the device of 'technical politics' (Thompson, 
1986) with the result that "...political accountability at local level is... sacrificed on the alter of the 
politically useful illusion of technical precision" (Hunter, 1994a, p. 21). Whether this scenario represents 
the outcome of a 'hidden agenda', or the unintended consequences of public policy, its realization would 
radically undermine the fundamental principles of health care provision in the UK. In addition, although 
official guidelines continue to place emphasis on the increased freedoms enjoyed by NHS trusts, and on the 
need for individual accountability for key performance indicators such as asset utilization, staff sickness 
and turnover (Audit Commission, 1994b), it is rarely acknowledged that trust provider units are policy 
contrivances created by statute rather than legally constituted business entities free to ex-ploit the potential 
of the market. The conceptual adequacy of the provider relationship with the market can thus be 
questioned on the grounds that while the latter represents a dynamic and unpredictable process, the former 
are constrained by relatively static and predictable bureaucratic procedures. ConsequenUy, provider units 
function in a potentially hostile environment and it is not therefore surprising to find that managers, 
concerned about their inability to achieve business objectives because of the lack of meaningful devolution 
and the conceptual inadequacies of 'independent' trusts and the internal market, are becoming increasingly 
involved in the debate about public sector accountability, management ethics and the re-assertion of public 
service values (Bayliss, 1994a; Bayliss, 1994b; IHSM, 1994c; IHSM, I994d; Millar, 1994). As a result, a 
code of conduct and accountability has been drafted by the NHSME to compliment existing guidelines for 
the conduct of NHS staff concerned with fiscal issues (NHSME, 1993b) and, subject to consultative 
amendments, the new code will be implemented in April 1995. In a similar context, doctors 
representatives are also critical of the results of change to date and the Chair of the British Medical 
Association has recentiy argued that "...it was time to reform the reforms, to reinstate equity of access and 
to strive for equity of outcome in healthcare" (quoted in May and Miller, 1994, p. 14). These values, that 
are centi-al to the profession of medicine in the UK, tiius appear to be gaining renewed prominence 
amongst general managers in the NHS and illustrates, perhaps, that the socialization process within health 
care organizations continues to be significantiy influenced by a medical culture that, though having 
apparendy been somewhat subdued, is nonetheless alive and well. 
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Alternatively, this fusion of ideals may represent a temporary truce to compensate for an equally 
temporary gap in the information-base required by management if they are to successfully negotiate with 
the centre for resources, and with purchasing organizations for contracts. The view that provider unit 
management is simply about preserving what exists has been described as a 'dangerous illusion' that must 
be replaced by a proactive approach that reshapes the purpose and fiinction of hospitals (Manning, 1994). 
However, the relatively favourable environment that existed for the development and ex-pansion of hospital 
sector services during the 1960s and 1970s has clearly disappeared, partly as a direct result of the success 
of the NHS and other social programmes in improving the health status of the population, and partly 
because of increased public awareness of the economic and opportunity costs of modem health care 
delivery systems. In addition, the politico-ideological promotion of the concept of consumer sovereignty 
since the early 1980's has resulted in greater public expectations about the quality of care and standards of 
service provided by health care institutions. Yet, there is some evidence (see Chapter Four, p. 43 above) 
that suggests there is considerable public scepticism about the ability of the new NHS to fulfil these 
expectations - perhaps because of the constraints of the contractual process and other environmental issues 
that may limit or alter the intended impact of recent reforms: as Hunter (1994b, p. 19) notes, it was 
precisely because of the imperfections of the market that health care issues were "...located in the public 
sector in the first place." 
Nevertheless, quality issues are likely to assume a more prominent place on the agenda of 
provider units for two reasons. First, in the financial year 1993-94, central fiinding for quality initiatives 
such audit included an additional allocation to "...facilitate and "pump prime" the development of multi-
professional clinical audit." (NHSME, 1993c). This development is likely to rejuvenate professional 
interest in the audit process, partly because it represents an opportunity to focus the efforts of various 
health care groups on patient centred improvements, though, conversely, these groups may also try to 
defend established 'tribal' boundaries (PoUitt, 1992). Second, central funding for audit will cease at the 
end of the financial year 1994-95; such funding must then be sought from purchasers and included within 
the overall costs of contracts. It follows therefore, that there is likely to be competition between health 
care professionals for these limited resources, and that both managers, who will effectively become the 
budget holders of contract-related funds earmarked for quality activities, and purchasers, being the source 
of such funding, will each be in a stronger position to demand a more prominent role in specifying the 
content and direction of audit and other quality improvement progranmies. 
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However, the politico-ideological and economic arguments that have underpinned the NHS 
reforms have resulted in a neo-Taylorist form of scientific management which makes littie distinction 
between management tasks in the public and private sector, that assumes management to be both a 
specialist and executive activity, and that demands the quantifiable demonstration of the attainment of 
predetermined objectives (Hood, 1991; Ranade, 1994). Thus, although politically induced macro-level 
change has clearly altered the meso-level organizational environment of healtii care in the UK, the model 
of public sector management and the resultant management culttjre that has evolved within the NHS may 
not be conducive to progressive improvements in the quality of care and services that are conceptually 
consistent with the philosophy of Total Quality Management. Yet, during what is clearly an important 
transitional phase in the development of UK health care, questions about the quality of both care and 
services will become crucially important for provider units if they are to retain the confidence of 
purchasers and if they are to re-establish die virtues of public sector health care provision. 
C H A P T E R S E V E N 
T H E IMPACT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL 
SYSTEMS ON MEDICAL AUDIT AND QUALITY 
A review of the literature and other documentary sources relating to recent changes in the NHS provides a 
necessary research overview of the development of quality issues in hospital-based provider units, but there 
are several grounds for arguing that it produces a substantially inadequate 'cognitive map' (Weick and 
Bougon, 1986) for the participant observer. First, the anticipated conflicts implied by the literature are 
concealed within a complex network of formal social relations that are based partly on tradition and partly 
on new forms of interaction between the various professional groups concerned with the deliver)' of care 
and the management of services. Second, although these formal social relations convey an image of 
structured hierarchies, linear authority and rational decision making processes, they reveal little about 
either the nature or significance of the informal organization within health care provider units. Third, 
variations in the technical aspects of the work are often considerable between different disciplines and can 
have a major influence on the degree to which they are amenable to the application of audit or other 
quality techniques, or the extent to which they are dependent on the efforts of other services. Fourth, the 
organization and control of the medical audit process often precludes external verification and thus raises 
questions about the validity of results and about accountability. Finally, the researcher is constrained to 
search for evidence of major social change precisely because of the de-stabilizing effects of the reforms on 
the role of the hospital, but may thus fail to observe that the resultant incertitude, though mediated through 
new mechanisms, involves a substantial degree of adherence to the conventions of an established social 
order in which the actual distribution of power and authority does not mirror the formal bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, in spite of some justifiable scepticism about the overall impact of the NHS reforms 
(Robinson and Le Grand, 1994), the medical audit initiative can be regarded as a qualified success insofar 
as audit has rapidly permeated medical practice and has been extended to nursing and other clinical areas. 
This success, its advantages, limitations and variations, will be explained with reference to the different 
socio-cultural and technical systems that are found to co-exist within hospital provider units, and by 
placing their development within the wider context of other aspects of the reforms. Consistent themes 
identified during the study concern environmental, organizational, technical and ethical issues, and their 
effects on medical audit, on other quality initiatives and on organizational culture will be discussed. 
74 
Within provider units, two distinct environmental settings are observable. On the one hand, 
the medical setting is characterized by a measure of predictability, clarity, limited formal and extensive 
informal relationships with other clinical professions. Conversely, non-clinical managers occupy a 
relatively turbulent setting characterized by ambiguity, limited informal and multiple formal 
communication and accountability relationships. However, to account for the features of the managerial 
setting it is necessary to understand something of the changing composition of health service management 
and the diversity of management tasks and roles. Contemporary provider units contain five broad groups 
of managerial staff, viz: Senior general managers, including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who 
have responsibility for planning, human resource management and service development, and who are 
ultimately accountable for the overall performance of the hospital. Specialist managers who, for example, 
are responsible for financial accounting, estates management and management information systems (MIS). 
Clinical directors who perform a dual medical-managerial role and are responsible for the operational 
performance of medical specialties. Divisional managers who function in support of clinical directors and 
have largely displaced the role of nurse managers. Finally, supervisory managers are responsible for 
various support service departments such as medical records, supplies, and patient services. 
During the early years of the reforms, all clinical and non-clinical directors, the CEO, the 
chairperson of the medical staff and the postgraduate medical tutor normally provided tiie membership of 
the hospital board. However the size and composition of these 'executive teams' proved to be ineffective, 
inefficient and incompatible with the needs of the organization. On one hand, hospital-wide membership 
effectively led to the return of consensus management, resulted in incremental or non-decision making and 
was thus, both ineffective and incompatible with the concept of general management. On the otiier hand, 
the inclusion of a large number of senior medical staff consumed a substantial part of clinical time and, 
given that meetings lasted half of one day and agenda items were often considered to be 'not clinically 
relevant'^ \^ it was not uncommon for medical staff to be 'bleeped' out of such meetings - usually for valid 
reasons, but sometimes by contrived prior arrangement. However, these weaknesses are being addressed 
through a reorganization of the executive function that allows for Directors of Clinical Services to 
represent the interests of all medical specialties, but who may also be considered as senior line managers. 
(1) Single quotation marks are used throughout this Chapter to indicate the actual words used by 
respondents, or to denote the use of conventional terms that were observed to be used by subjects. 
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A more recent development involves the appointment of executive directors of nursing and 
quality and, in NHS trust hospitals there are, of course, an additional number of non-executive board 
members. Yet, since the latter have no formal organizational powers, ajid the former perform a co-
ordinating role in respect of quality activities and a consultative role with regard to nursing - they are 
rarely responsible for operational nurse management - new board-level arrangements have, to some extent, 
resulted in a measure of internal de-politicisation of the executive management function. None the less, 
the transformation from what was essentially a reactive administrative organizational culture to one 
characterized by proactive managerialism has clearly resulted in a multiplicity of formal interfaces for the 
generalists. 
In addition, although the advent of general management in the NHS has resulted in increased 
authority and responsibility for former administrators, who account for 60 per cent of Unit General 
Managers (Jones, 1994, Table 11.3, p. 452), their peers include a substantial number of former medical 
and nursing practitioners (29%), other health service workers (3%) and a significant proportion (8%) of 
staff with no previous health sector experience {Ibid.). Moreover, the separation of the purchaser and 
provider roles, together with the ensuing contractual mechanisms, created a need for middle management 
skills that were not readily available from internal sources. Consequentiy, health service management has 
experienced a large influx of staff drawn from industry and business in the private sector where values and 
belief systems are somewhat different from those traditionally associated with public institutions - and 
competence in the former does not imply competence in the latter. Management in provider units does 
not merely involve internal co-ordination and control, but requires the often sensitive management of the 
interface with a highly politicised external environment. Furthermore, though it has been argued above, 
(Chapter 6, p. 70), that managerial values may be influenced by the clinical professions, former 
administrators have become involved in the public sector management socialisation process for new 
recruits to the health care arena, staff who have often expressed ex-perience of the 'cultural shock' of 
having to substitute 'tactical political behaviour' for what they formerly understood as the implementation 
of 'strategic business planning'. Thus, while the primary intention of the introduction of general 
management was to effect change in organizational performance, senior managers also have a role in 
maintaining a measure of continuity with regard to the health service managerial ethos. Yet, the st)'le of 
management in health care, and the career path of managerial post-holders has changed in several 
important respects - some of which may not be compatible with the concept of qualit>' improvement. 
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In contrast to the pre-Griffiths era, when health service administrators could reasonably expect 
a measure of upward occupafional mobility during the life-time of their employment, new management 
appointments tend to be of fixed term duration and condnuity of employment is often dependent upon the 
realisation of specific objectives. These objectives also provide the criteria for Individual Performance 
Review (IPR) and thus, for the disbursement of Performance Related Pay (PRP). Although such 
objectives are overwhelmingly financial in character they have necessarily involved the development and 
implementafion of new organizational structures designed to facilitate the devolution of some budgetary 
responsibilities, the development of national initiatives such as resource management, and the negotiation 
of new practices designed to ensure demonstrable conformance with politically determined standards for 
patient care (NHSME, 1992). To these can be added: the requirement to achieve a return on capital 
assets, the operational need to re-determine staffing levels and skill mix in response to purchaser service 
specifications and a fimdamental requirement to update management information systems. In short, 
despite the financial underpinning of many of these objectives, the sheer potential for overioad demands 
achievement through other people. Yet, since responsibility and authority for the organization of provider 
units has been transferred to the general manager, whose performance, as noted above, is individually 
determined against specified criteria, the resultant style of 'management by objectives' is clearly 
reminiscent of the Taylorist thesis on scientific management (Taylor, 1947), and is wholly inconsistent 
with the central TQM concept of employee empowerment. Within the TQM concept 'objectives' are 
regarded as plarming tools rather than management techniques and it has not been uncommon to obser\'e 
the devolution of control over directorate budgets to divisional managers, only to witness the unit-wide re-
centialization of such controls following failure to meet budgetary targets - even when divisional managers 
had little or no input into the determination of such targets in the first place. This is not to say that there 
is necessarily a shortage of infra-organizational collaboration or goodwill, but to argue that there is a 
major contradiction between what health service general managers are required to achieve and the 
management style that they have been consfrained to adopt. It may therefore be this contradiction, 
illustrated in Figure 15 overleaf, ratiier than the influence of other health care professionals, that has 
fuelled increasing management concern with issues about public service values, ethics and accountability. 
Nevertheless, in the operational arena managers often express their dissatisfaction with current 
arrangements in terms of their frustration with 'the arrogance' and autonomy of medical practitioners, but, 
in doing so, they may have failed to recognise that the changing role of hospital doctors has extended 
rather than limited their range of career opportunities. 
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Just as the world of health service managers has undergone a radical fransformation, so too has 
that of consultant grade medical staff who practice in the hospital sector. Although the reforms have 
affected all medical practitioners, consultants have been most affected partly because they are the senior 
line managers for all other grades of doctor and thus continue to control the medical socialization process, 
and partly because consultants accept responsibility for the clinical management of patients admitted to 
hospital within his/her specialty, and, must "...remain responsible for the patient's subsequent care until 
another [consultant or specialist] doctor has agreed to take over that responsibility." (General Medical 
Council, 1993, para. 93). It can be argued therefore, that consultant medical staff possess at least two, 
and sometimes all three Weberian forms of authority, viz, rational-legal authority, by virtue of their 
appointment; traditional authority, by virtue of their clinical status and expertise; and perhaps charismatic 
authority - depending on their experience and other personal qualities (in Albrow, 1970). Thus, while 
consultant staff may have lost a measure of power to set the organizational agenda due to executive level 
reorganization (see above, p. 74), their retention of various forms of authority effectively ensures their 
monopoly over the clinical management of patients and, ipso facto, of the continuity of their power to 
influence the professional behaviour of other clinical staff groups - a productive form of disciplinary power 
according to Foucault (1973), or, from a structuralist perspective, a form of domination and control 
(Lukes, 1977). However, it is usual for consultant medical staff to specialize within their specific 
discipline - a physician may, for example, specialize in pulmonary (respiratory) medicine or cardiology 
(heart fimction), a surgeon in orthopaedics (the skeletal structure) or urology (kidney or urinarj' tract 
procedures) or an obstetrician in in-vitro fertilization (fertilizing human ova outside the body). This trend 
towards specialization is due in part, to advances in medical science and technologj' that have created both 
the scope and demand for such services, is partly due to individual aspiration for professional 
development, but is also because the demand for hospital based specialist services has resulted in a 
specialist qualification often being a precondition for a consultant grade appointment. In short, the 
increasing costs associated with infinite social demand for health care are substantially influenced by the, 
albeit well intentioned, supply-side activities of consultant-specialists who contiol a large volume of 
revenue expenditure. It follows, that changing the behaviour of hospital consultants is both a cenfral aim 
of many new policy initiatives and is a necessary precondition for achieving the objectives of increased 
efficiency and improved effectiveness in the hospital sector. However, some changes could lead to an 
expansion of medical power and may have occurred regardless of changes in policy. 
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Recent or plaimed changes that affect hospital consultants are both social and technical in 
nature and their significance can be distinguished at either the level of the individual, the organization or 
the profession (see Figure 16, overleaf). Social changes include: the development of new personal 
contractual arrangements (individual level); the implementation of Clinical Directorate management 
structures (organizational level); and proposed performance procedures, (professional level), that are 
plarmed for implementation in 1995 (Kilpatrick, 1994; General Medical Council, 1992). Technical 
changes include: setting Clinical Directorate budgetary targets (organizational level); the development of 
guidelines for clinical practice (individual specialty level); and the infroduction of medical audit which, 
although it has both individual and organization-wide implications, is essentially a professionally led 
activity. This is not however, to say that either the above changes or their identified level of impact are 
mutually exclusive, but is, on the other hand, to place such issues within the context of their implications 
for continuity or change in power relationships. Moreover, many other changes in working practices and 
provider unit organization can be associated with those outiined above, but, as will be described below, 
may underpin the potential for increased medical power which is illusfrated in Figure 16. Nevertheless, 
the transfer of consultant's confracts from Regional Health Authority control to that of the District Health 
Authorities, in respect of directly managed units, or to trust provider units, represents a considerable 
change in social confrol over the working practices of senior medical staff. General managers are now in 
a sfronger position to specify the nature and number of consultant sessions and may also, tiiough the issue 
is by no means settled, be able to implement a form of IPR for assessing consultants performance. 
However, this change in social relations does not merely underpin the authority of general managers, but 
may also facilitate the managerial role of consultants who are elected or appointed to Clinical Director 
posts. Clinical Directors are managerially accountable to the hospital board, either through the CEO or 
through the Director of Clinical Services, and their specific responsibilities include elements of directorate 
'business' planning, the delivery of services according to purchaser specification, and budgetary 
responsibility for staffing, and sometimes for resource consumption. Yet, they have littie formal (rational-
legal) authority, nor do they generally seek such authority, to enforce issues on their clinical colleagues 
who can, and do, 'cling rigidly' to the concept of 'clinical freedom' - a concept that the British Medical 
Association (1993) states: 
...is subject to the limits of the law, ethics, contracts, professional standards and 
resources so that Clinical Directors cannot commit colleagues to workloads or 
resource agreements, discipline or sanction colleagues, or override the clinical 
judgement of colleagues, (in White, 1993, p. 35) 
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It follows that where the role of Clinical Directors requires them to exercise a form of control 
over the work schedules of colleagues, their authority to do so is essentially based on the de facto 
devolution of new powers available to management. Moreover, in practice. Clinical Directors often have 
mere 'figure-head' budgetary responsibilities because formal accountability for directorate finances is 
conunonly invested in Divisional Managers who thus, flinction within an ambiguous dual line-
management relationship with clinicians and general managers. However, the advent of the directorates, 
together with the controls attributable to service contracts, have brought further changes that might 
reinforce the position of the medical profession. On the one hand, meso-level organizational change has 
resulted in the dis-organization of nursing insofar as its former hospital-wide professional base has become 
fragmented. On the other hand, while nursing staff are involved with the implementation of the orders of 
medical staff, for example, in terms of drug administration, conducting ward-based tests and in co-
ordinating the interface with other clinical services, cost-efficient changes in nursing skill-mix have 
resulted in the employment of partially trained auxiliary staff and a reduction in the number of 'level one' 
Registered Nurses (RNs) and nurse specialists. In spite of their supportive role, these latter two groups 
are sufficiently qualified to often question the appropriateness of medical decisions, but the reduction in 
their number limits the scope for this informal type of control. A further change relating to the 
establishment of new structures involves the merging of clinical services, most conunonly between 
Obstetrics and Paediatrics - often re-constituted the Directorate of 'Women's and Children's Services'. 
Yet, since such measures are essentially designed to effect more efficient resource usage and better co-
ordination between, in this case, the clinical management of childbirth (obstetrics) and the neonatal care 
of the new-bom (paediatrics), it may prove difficult to alter clinical behaviour given that distinct specialty 
and discipline specific medical hierarchies are retained. Indeed, specialization can subvert the formal 
organization in the sense that, although cross-specialty referrals will be documented in the medical record, 
discussions that both lead to, and follow fi-om referral decisions are often conducted informally during 
'corridor consultations' between doctors. Consequentiy, there are no recorded data tiiat might be used to 
verify the appropriateness or effectiveness of many referrals and, though such issues are often discussed by 
doctors, this usually takes the form of an educational exercise rather than a performance review of 
practice. Thus, though the provider organization may be able to determine what work was done and how 
much it may have cost, it will rarely be able to determine why! Moreover, if such questions were to be 
raised, new organizational structures have effectively placed formal 'gate-keepers' (Directors of Clinical 
Services and Clinical Directors) between general managers and the mass of consultant grade medical staff. 
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However, there are other issues that provide incentives for greater co-operation between 
managers and clinicians. Management, usually through the CEO, now have a major input into the 
allocation of consultant merit awards, and meso-level reorganization has generally provided clinicians 
with access to decision-making forums from which they were previously excluded precisely because of 
organizational inadequacies. Consequently, many doctors who are regarded as 'local leaders', but who 
expended their leadership energies at RHA level where major decision-making powers were formerly 
located, now function as local 'champions' or change agents at provider level. But, it follows that it is 
through these local 'champions', rather than general management, that major changes in consultants 
behaviour will likely be achieved. Thus, the conventions of the established social order within the 
medical profession, that have, in a sense, been reinforced by the presence of professional 'gate-keepers', 
will continue to be adhered to. Furthermore, the proposed implementation of professionally determined 
performance procedures, perhaps designed to pre-empt management led IPR, are likely to further 
strengthen the position of unit-based medical leaders. The General Medical Council (GMC) currently has 
statutory powers for dealing with professional misconduct and criminal negligence. However, these 
powers are considered inadequate for dealing with the non-specific, but generally poor clinical 
performance of some members of the profession. Thus, it is proposed that a system of peer review 
monitoring of clinical performance be implemented, and conducted and assessed at local level by "...two 
doctors from the same field of practice", but referred, if necessary, to the GMC by a 'responsible senior 
medical officer' (Kilpatrick, Op. cit., pp. 123-129). Again, this proposal, if enacted, represents a 
considerable change in medical social relations, but one that may be dependent upon the technical 
development of guidelines for clinical practice and therefore shares a measure of consistency with related 
central policy objectives (NHSME, 1993d; NHSME, 1994). Nevertheless, such changes would also 
represent an extension of the principle of 'state sanctioned self-regulation in medicine', (see Chapter 1, p. 
5, above), and could reasonably be expected to enhance the formal professional authority of those 
consultant medical staff, such as Clinical Directors, and others who are recognised as 'responsible senior 
medical officers'. It is important however, to note that while there is a direct technical relationship 
between medical audit and the development of clinical guidelines, the GMC have indicated that they do 
not wish to see a direct link between their proposed performance procedures and the process of medical 
audit which they regard to be fundamentally underpinned by the principle of 'confidentiality' (Kilpatrick, 
Op. cit., p. 128) - a principle which, together with other issues, has resulted in extremely limited 
management involvement in the medical audit process. 
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An account of managerial involvement in medical audit can be explained within three specific 
contexts. First, in terms of legitimate management interests insofar as these have been recognised and 
accepted by both managers and clinicians - essentially a descriptive exercise. Second, in terms of what 
has actually occurred, which, though also a descriptive exercise, demands a measure of ex-planation. 
Third, in terms of what is theoretically desirable, or likely to occur given the progressive impact of other 
aspects of the reforms - essentially a predictive, and perhaps, a prescriptive exercise. 
The implementation of the medical audit initiative became a formal requirement within hospital-
based medical practice in April 1991, and was organized and promoted, at unit level, by Local Medical 
Audit Committees (LMACs) and audit support staff in accordance with government guidelines (DoH, 
HC(91)2, 1991). While general managers had little option but to accept the official line that medical 
audit was 'primarily a matter for the medical profession' (DHSS, 1989; see Chapter 1, p. 7, above), the 
financial arrangements designed to support the audit initiative constrained a measure of management 
interest from the outset. Audit funds were provided by the centre, were 'ring-fenced' for audit use only, 
contained distinct capital and revenue components, were distributed to provider units through the RHAs, 
and were largely, though not always, devolved to LMAC control. However, the potential for ex-penditure, 
both on staff and capital equipment, that had recurrent revenue implications, in terms of salaries or 
equipment maintenance for example, thus created a legitimate need for a measure of managerial 
involvement in L M A C decisions. Managers also had formal authority (DoH, Op. cit.) to receive regular 
reports on the general progress and results of audit activity, but in all other relevant respects, during the 
formative period of audit implementation (1991-2) these latter issues represent the extent of management 
involvement in the audit process - an involvement considered by some medical staff to be limited to 'the 
signing of the relevant cheques'. During this early period, the audit initiative was substantially supported 
by the RHAs. The RHAs provided funding for regular meetings of LMAC Chairs - partly to facilitate the 
dissemination of new ideas and partly to obtain feedback on implementation. They also supported similar 
forums for the education and training of audit support staff, and for various 'working parties' whose terms 
of reference included, for example, the development of 'Audit Information Flows'. The 'working parties' 
excepted, general managers were neither present at regional LMAC meetings - which were dominated 
almost exclusively by consultant grade medical staff, nor at those involving heterogeneous groups of audit 
support staff whose backgrounds characteristically included junior managers, middle and senior grade 
nurses, medical records officers, statisticians and newly qualified social science graduates. 
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The general development of medical audit was thus directed by consultant medical staff who 
form the nucleus of LMACs and who have often had prior audit training or experience. Audit committees 
are, in turn, supported by staff who, at the outset, were relatively inexperienced in audit principles or 
techniques, and were therefore susceptible to a socialization process that involved external and supra-
regional education and training provided by a variety of institutions that included some of the Royal 
Colleges, the medical faculties of some universities or private sector consultancy firms that had a vested 
interest in propagating the virtues of the literature - a literature that was largely based on work produced 
by medical practitioners. In short, if audit support staff were considered to be, albeit junior, change 
agents, they rapidly and understandably developed a degree of empathy with the values of the medical 
profession. 
Moreover, given the high regional profile in audit development during what was clearly a major 
transitional period in both the structure and internal politics of the health service, management were at a 
distinct disadvantage since their ranks were dominated by former administrators who were educated and 
trained to function at, and within, a district-based system tiiat was in the process of being discarded. 
Consequentiy, they suffered from a lack of 'tiaditional authority' because of the newness of their 
occupational role and status, and from a related absence of relevant expertise that limited their potential to 
utilize the rational-legal aufliority associated witii their new appointments. This meant that tiieir agenda 
was already dominated, not merely by financial matters, but by the need to learn new skills in order to 
attend to issues arising from organizational, environmental and technical change. In short, against the 
background of their envirormient, and given the limitations for their involvement in medical audit implied 
by governmental and professional definitions of the concept, managers had neither the incentive nor the 
time to either assimilate audit concepts or to devote to the audit process. Thus, although management 
interest in audit and other related issues has altered more recentiy, the relative absence of external 
interference in the development of medical audit in the hospital sector, for the reasons outiined above, has, 
with some justification, led to the commonly held belief that the implementation of the medical audit 
initiative was the least contentious of the post-1989 reforms. However, medical audit has effectively been 
internalized within the profession and within provider institutions: LMACs have now been established in 
all units, formal audit programmes are common in all clinical directorates and sub-specialties, dedicated 
audit information systems have been developed, and annual reports on audit are routinely produced. But, 
these successes are subject to variations and limitations in terms of tiieir effectiveness. 
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Variations and limitations in the effectiveness of medical audit programmes can, again, be best 
described in relation to the multiple social and technical systems that exist within hospitals, but which 
affect different groups or impact on certain activities in different ways. Nevertheless, since audit activit)', 
not to be confused with the LMAC role which is essentially concerned vritii development, monitoring and 
support, is organized on a directorate and sub-specialty basis, variations in effectiveness must be placed 
within the context of those factors that are cential to, or impinge upon the audit process, viz: directorate 
'structure and function'; information systems and 'ownership' of data; and audit information flows. 
Although clinical directorates have evolved in response to the need for better forms of internal 
management, they also represent a distinct form of the specialized division of labour in secondary health 
care institutions. Each directorate represents a specific faculty of medicine and is externally supported by 
colleges that, among other things, specify many of the discipline specific technical standards to which 
members owe professional allegiance. Moreover, there is mutual recognition, between the colleges, of 
their rational-legal authority to specify such standards, and individually and collectively, they represent a 
powerfiil lobby that has 'insider' access to both the legislative and administrative organs of goverrmient 
and that can either facilitate or inhibit the process of change at the 'front line'. In short, just as the 
medical profession as a whole can draw upon similarly powerful resources, in the shape of the British 
Medical Association (BMA) and the GMC, that protect and advance their social interests (pay and 
conditions for example), the colleges represent a secondary level of nationally-based professional 
bureaucratization that is centrally concerned with the development and maintenance of technical aspects 
of the work of their members. Thus, while there is much common ground between medical staff in terms 
of their educational background, economic and social status, values and beliefs, this commonality tends to 
be socio-cultural rather than technical in character. Hence, given that a directorate that includes say six 
consultants, each of whom have expertise in a different sub-specialty, it follows that in addition to the 
ethical limitations on the ability of these doctors to impinge on the work of tiieir colleagues (see p. 79, 
above), there are additional, technical and rational-legal, reasons why such influence may be limited -
reasons that are underpiimed by the demand (see, p. 78, above) for hospital based specialist services. The 
implications for medical audit are thus, tiiat although clinical practice can be subjected to peer review at 
provider unit level, and guidelines for such practice, including resource usage, can be agreed at this local 
level, their implementation and application is often subject to the results of supra-regional specialty-based 
audit which is, by definition, conducted outwith the formal sphere of influence of the directorate structure. 
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In addition, the design and execution of an audit study, and the validity of its results can be 
sigiuficantly influenced by the sophistication, in either technological or 'artistic' terms, of the type of 
procedure(s) under review, or by the nature of the disease and condition of the patient to which such 
procedures are applied. In the Directorate of Surgery for example, while it is relatively easy to 
investigate, treat and measure aspects of orthopaedic practice concerned with, say an uncomplicated 
femoral fracture, (fracture of the femur or thigh bone), the same may not be true for the urological 
investigation and treatment of renal failure, (kidney disease), which can have multiple causes such as 
drug-related abuse, trauma or infection, or be related to other complications such as chronic heart failure 
or hypertension that require the intervention of a physician who specializes in cardiology. 
Similarly, in the Directorate of Medicine, while it is reasonably stiaight forward to establish 
guidelines for the clinical management of acute respiratory diseases, in the investigation of a progressive 
illness such as acute lymphatic leukaemia, (a malignant disease characterized by large numbers of 
immature blood cells), although the diagnosis can be determined, pathologically, with a degree of 
certainty, the uncertain progress of the disease, which may periodically go into recession, represents a 
major constraint regarding the determination of normal or 'best' practice in respect of the treatment of the 
disease. Indeed, in such cases, it is common for 'best' practice, with regard to drug therapy, to be 
determined through randomised control trials (RCTs) that are a form of medical research regulated by a 
stringent ethical code, are usually organized at national or international level and are thus, outside the 
conceptual and technical scope of the audit initiative. However, this type of limitation is recognized and 
medical audit activities are thus intended to focus on practices that are 'common' within localities. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the focus of medical audit activity is not simply a matter of study 
design, data collection and analysis, but will vary depending on the disease profile of the population, the 
availability of relevant expertise, and the extent to which audit is appropriate in practical terms. Practical 
considerations include the number of patient episodes available for comparison, the availability of relevant 
data, tiie time and other resources available for the stiidy, and the period over which die study is 
conducted. Where, for example, there are few local instances of a particular disease, the results of stiidies 
conducted over a substantial period may be invalidated by intervening results of research. Alternatively, 
supra-regional or local inter-unit audit can be considered, but it might prove difficult to implement 
changes in practice unless the unit representative is in total agreement with his/her clinical colleagues. 
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As with many other aspects of the recent reforms, the success, or otherwise, of the medical audit 
initiative is often assessed quantitatively, that is, with regard to levels of participation by medical staff, and 
in respect of the volume of audit activity with which tiiey are associated. Moreover, in addition to the 
environmental, structural and technical consfraints mentioned above (pp. 85-86), other directorate-level 
barriers to effective audit include social issues regarding personality conflicts and rivalries, access to and 
the availability of audit education, and the question of authority. In this latter context, those identified as 
'lead clinicians' for the promotion of audit are not necessarily senior members of the directorate's medical 
staff. Indeed, during the uncertain formative period of audit implementation, it was not uncommon for 
the less senior consultants to be 'elected', by their more senior colleagues, to the 'non-remunerable 
position of lead clinician for audit'. Furthermore, there can also be conflicts, if not of interests, then of 
priorities when the posts of Director of Clinical Services, Clinical Director, lead clinician for audit, Chair 
of the Medical Staff and Chair of the LMAC all, or in some combination, fall within the remit of a single 
directorate, but are occupied by different individuals. Although new executive level arrangements (see 
pp. 74-75, above), together with the growing acceptance of audit as a 'legitimate and obligatory part of 
professional practice' have done much to overcome some of these initial 'social problems', the directorate-
level organization of audit can result in the marginalization of minority opinion, especially that of the 
junior doctors. Consequentiy, definitions of what constitutes 'best practice' may thus amount to littie 
more than the re-statement of what is already being done by those who perceive their interests to lie in 
continuity, and who may therefore, exercise any of the three Weberian forms of authority that are inherent 
within medical hierarchies. Nevertheless, the outcome or qualitative aspects of audit activities have had 
other variable effects in terms of their impact on practice and the integration of audit with otiier 
organizational issues. However, these kinds of variations and limitations have much to do with the 
question of data and data systems, with the flow of information and, most importantiy, with the issue of 
confidentiality. 
The majority of data required by provider units, not only for medical audit, but for resource 
management, budgeting, contracting and statutory reporting - many of which are new 'data consumption 
activities'- originate at the substantial interface between clinicians and their patients. Consequently, the 
sheer volume of such data, and the various new uses to which it must be applied have resulted in the 
recognition that health sector data management procedures and data captiire systems were wholly 
inadequate. Large-scale changes are therefore eitlier in progress, or have recentiy been implemented. 
88 
The operational requirements of the 'internal market' have effectively demanded that provider 
units develop fidly integrated management information systems (MIS) such as that illustiated at Figure 14 
(p. 66, above). Yet, central funding for projects of this scale has been limited to a small number of 'pilot 
demonstration sites' and has, in any event, ceased to be available. Other units were assisted, though to a 
lesser degree, as part of the Resource Management Initiative (RMI), but almost all hospitals have benefited 
from the capital element of funds that are intended to facilitate the development of information systems in 
support of medical audit. Nonetheless, variations in both regional and local policies, constiained to some 
extent by national policy on the distribution and use of audit funds, have resulted in the development of a 
diverse range of audit information systems, some of which are technically incompatible with either 
Resource Management (KM) or other integrated MIS. Such diversity includes the range of apphcation 
software, hardware platforms and operating environments, and concomitant variations in tiaining 
requirements and service maintenance contracts were, perhaps, inevitable. Subsequentiy, it has become 
clear that the contradictory and often ambiguous nature of cential and regional audit funding guidelines 
must bear the brunt of the criticism for these latter developments. 
On the one hand, although technical compatibility between audit and resource management 
systems was a major concern of the cenfre, the lack of relevant information technology (IT) skills at local 
level resulted in a correspondingly slow rate of RM systems implementation and denied LMACs the 
specialist support they required to properly execute their responsibilities for the use of the capital 
component of their audit budgets. To compound the issue, continued capital fiinding for medical audit 
depended on the ability of the LMACs to demonsfrate, in their annual reports to the RHAs, significant and 
salient use of the previous year's capital allocation. It follows, that the development of audit information 
systems was, in many instances, thus constrained to precede those relating to resource management 
projects. Consequently, some provider units, usually those in the 'vanguard of audit development', lost 
the potential to benefit from the economies of scale that would almost certainly have been available 
through the application of a more integrated procurement policy. The lessons from tiiese early 
experiences have since been applied to subsequent IT developments which should result in a greater 
degree of technical integration between the various components of future information systems. However, 
the technical inconsistencies associated with eariier developments have not only limited the capacity for 
the expansion of some systems, but have also resulted in largely medical 'ownership' and contiol of audit 
data, and on the resultant use and dissemination of that data. 
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It would be both naive and inaccurate however, to imply that the medical profession's contiol 
over data pertaining to the practice of its members can be explained solely in terms of technological 
determinism. There are, for example, other meso-level political reasons why early audit information 
systems did not always interface with Resource Management. First, the devolution of control over audit 
funds to LMACs was neither uniform nor complete, but where it did occur, there tended to be greater 
medical interest in audit development. Second, the lack of local expertise meant that management were 
also 'blind' to the strengths and weaknesses of alternative IT stiategies. But, they expressed a 
comprehensive vision of the recurrent revenue implications of LMAC decisions and thus, since this latter 
issue was within their traditional sphere of competence, and was central to their new general role, it 
provided the primary focus of management attention on the use of the audit budget. However, in all other 
respects, the LMACs, to whom audit budgetary control had been devolved, were presented with an 
opportunistic occasion upon which they might fiilfil tiieir obligations in respect of the co-ordination and 
development of audit without really 'caring less whether the Resource Management [systems] actiially 
worked or not'. This 'cavalier' attitude, though characteristic of the past, has since been replaced by a 
more mature relationship between managers and clinicians, particularly since the latter are more aware of 
the opportunity and resource costs of their decisions; "Wastage of resources is unethical because it 
diminishes society's capacity to relieve suffering" (BMA, 1993, p. 300). Nevertiieless, RM was generally 
regarded by clinicians as a management-centred initiative. It was perceived in this way partiy because of 
the relatively greater emphasis, than was evident with regard to audit, on ensuring the technical 
integration between the new RM computer software applications and existing management tools such as 
patient administration systems (PAS). Management ownership of PAS was confirmed by a frequent 
criticism, expressed both by clinicians and audit support staff, about their general inability to gain 
management authority to access PAS for audit purposes. This type of observation might therefore, be 
regarded as an example of internal political behaviour, but confirms that control over data in health care is 
perceived as a form of power. In a similar vein, medical staff displayed a comparable form of conduct by 
forming a protective 'bull ring' around the audit systems that they had helped to develop. Clinicians tiius 
control the type of data entered into audit information systems and exercise a measure of direction over 
data entry through audit or secretarial support staff. In addition, by virtue of the rational-legal authority 
of the LMACs, they can control the use of, and access to, much of the data stored in such systems and 
though the reasons for the retention of such controls may be implicitly political, they are explicitly retained 
on the basis of ethical arguments about the principle of confidentiality. 
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The confidentiality of audit data is maintained through a combination of social and technical 
mechanisms. In a social context, these include the development of extremely close working relationships 
between consultant grade medical and audit support staff - though this relationship is commonly 
reinforced by 'signed confidentiality statements' that are essentially technical and potentially punitive 
devices that can result in an employee's dismissal for any breach of what are often ambiguously defined 
concepts of confidentiality. The directorate based organization of audit is also a social characteristic that 
protects both the confidentiality of data and of the information that can be obtained from its subsequent 
analysis and interpretation. Yet, here too, a variety of standards, written by professional colleges and that 
can be considered as 'technical specifications [instruments] for the conduct of audit', together with the 
formal unit-level constitutions that outiine the terms of reference of the LMACs, also reinforce this latter 
aspect of the social system. However, these formal mechanisms often conceal rather simple technical 
devices that effectively limit access to audit data. At the level of the individual, control over data input, 
both in a physical or remote sense, that is, through other people, or by direct involvement in IT system 
design and 'data field definition', means direct personal control over information that relates to a 
clinician's professional practice, and, of course, medical staff have a substantial measure of influence at 
the patient interface where much data originates. At supra-regional level, confrol of specialt}'-based audit 
information is exercised through the device of 'data anonymization' - the National Confidentiality 
Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths (Campling et. al., 1993) being a well known example of this process. 
At directorate level, the device of data aggregation is used to prohibit the individual identification of 
practitioners, and at provider unit level, control over audit related data is ensured through a process of 
generalization - (see Figure 17, overleaf). Thus, the higher the flow of audit data, the less meaningful it 
is for individual assessment. However, the mechanisms described above are designed to 'maintain the 
integrity' of the principle of confidentiality which, though often attacked by management as a mere 
substitute for unwarranted 'secrecy', has nevertheless, a degree of practical substance. 
The International Code of Medical Ethics states that all doctors must ensure "...absolute 
confidentiality on all he [she] knows about his [her] patient" (BMA, 1993, p. 37). However, tiie BMA go 
on to argue that this "...council of perfection rather than [practice]" {Ibid.) goes much further than 
contemporary professional perceptions and that, in any case, confidentiality is a concept that is inherentiy 
confradictory. Moreover, managers also have an interest in the maintenance of confidentiality, albeit of a 
different nature, but one that could, paradoxically, undermine their desire for more open communication. 
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On the one hand, the principle of confidentiality is regarded as the formal basis of trust betiveen 
the doctor and his/her patient. Where such tiiist cannot be guaranteed, then the patient may witiihold 
information that is crucial to their health statiis, or to the health status of others including patients, visitors 
or staff (BMA, Op. cit.) Confidentiality may thus be regarded, not only as a means of facilitating 
appropriate treatment, but as a necessary principle that underpins the management of risk. In either of 
these respects, there is littie disagreement between managers and clinicians. Indeed, the new corporate 
identity associated with most provider units has constrained their management bodies to adopt a 'market 
sensitivity' to some kinds of information. However, poor clinical practice also creates potential risks to 
patients, and to the organization in terms of the financial implications of litigation if it can be shown that 
a provider unit does not have effective procedures for monitoring the performance of its staff. In this 
respect, unit-level discord is more common since medical audit is, definitively, concerned with clinical 
practice and not with clinical performance - though, given the emphasis on audit confidentiality, it can be 
inferred that there is at least an implicit relationship between the two. In short, while the CMC's 
proposed performance procedures might fill this void in the future (see p.p. 79 & 82, above), there are no 
current mechanisms at the meso-level for monitoring the effectiveness of individual practitioners. It 
follows therefore, that managerial reliance on medical audit as a measure of clinical effectiveness also 
means assuming corporate responsibility, and liability, for activities over which the management function 
has no direct contiol. 
Nonetheless, given the absence of any alternatives, provider unit managers are not generally 
dismayed with either the conduct or development of audit. On the other hand, few can 'see any direct 
relationship between audit and quality assurance', and many are 'concerned about the lack of impact tiiat 
audit has had on the rest of the organization'. Therefore, on the grounds of clarity, it is worth re-stating 
the distinction that medical audit is concerned with the quality of medical care, with ensuring that it meets 
acceptable standards, and does so through an educational process based on the peer review of practice. 
Medical audit is neither concerned with individual nor organizational performance, and certainly, in its 
current technical and organizational form, cannot influence organizational improvement - this is the 
purpose of TQM and the quality management function. However, in the sense that audit is conducted to 
the exclusion of otiier clinical groups who not only have a direct impact on patient care, but may also 
indirectiy influence tiie outcome of medical interventions, then the medical audit concept, tiiough not 
completely inadequate, is limited in scope for achieving some of its declared objectives. 
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Witii regard to this latter observation, and in respect of the issue of confidentiality, one fiuther 
point ought to be considered however, viz, that precisely because medical staff participate in the creation of 
the data against which their practice is reviewed, and since they are directiy involved in the analysis and 
interpretation of this data, then it follows that effective medical audit demands a guarantee that the 'good 
faith' tiiat is cential to the audit concept is not breached for punitive reasons, ff it were, tiien the 'hidden 
costs' of poor practice would, by definition, remain hidden. This issue is one of several that have 
prompted recent commentators to express a measure of unease about plans to extend and integrate medical 
audit with similar activities conducted by other clinical groups (Lord and Littlejohns, 1994). Yet these 
authors underestimate, perhaps, the extent to which the various clinical professions in hospital settings are 
already occupationally interdependent and express a 'we already work as a team' measure of enthusiasm 
for continuing to do so. Moreover, in spite of the variations and limitations of medical audit, and despite 
the continuity of an element of scepticism amongst some doctors (Black and Thompson, 1993), the audit 
initiative has resulted in successes that are well documented elsewhere (see, for example, BMJ, 1994; 
Hopkins, 1994; Walshe and Coles, 1993). 
Conversely, on the basis of the interpretations of the observations presented in this chapter, and 
on other limited evidence that reveals similar process related inadequacies in the audit concept, (Buxton, 
1994 in BMJ, 1994, Op. cit.), it is not yet clear whether the social and technical constiaints on audit can 
be sufficientiy overcome to justify further investment in the initiative. Nevertheless, as Lord and 
Littiejohns (Op. cit.) fiirther note, it is most likely that the question of continued audit and other quality 
related funding will be determined in the 'market' where increasing 'tensions' are creating a growing 
demand for more visible audit outputs. Plaimed changes in the source of audit funding may however, 
create fiirther variations in both the level of commitment to, and effectiveness of, medical or clinical audit 
programmes. On the one hand, research has shown (Hopkins, Op. cit., pp. 111-120) that only 30 per cent 
of purchasing authorities receive copies of LMAC minutes and that an identical proportion of LMACs had 
no formal relationships with their GP counterparts in the Medical Audit Advisory Groups (MAAGs). 
Hence, there is reason to suppose that the level of interest in audit that will be expressed in financial terms 
by purchasers is likely to vary depending on the level of interest formerly expressed in terms of 
information by the providers. This would clearly result in inter-unit variation in the ability of providers to 
sustain the audit initiative, could potentially lead to inter-locality inequity in the quality of care and thus, 
impact on the ability of providers to retain contracts in the fiiUire. 
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On the other hand, a recent and somewhat frustrated 'we'd like to shut them down, be we're not 
allowed to' comment, made to the author by a lay member of a health authority, indicates that the early 
limitations on purchasers placement of contracts has seen a partial revival as the centre focuses more of its 
energies on the 'managed' than on the 'competitive' elements of market relations. Moreover, the 
increasing emphasis on promoting mergers between DHAs and FHSAs (see Chapter 6, p. 64, above) 
consfrains a similar conclusion, and suggests that the centre is becoming increasingly sensitive to the fact 
that, although a 'market' might prove to be more efficient, it rarely produces this outcome with equal 
effect on all of its customers. 
Nevertheless, new funding arrangements will undoubtedly provide purchasers with greater 
influence on, and perhaps, greater responsibility for all quality developments within provider units. Thus, 
the need to compete on quality rather than simply on cost will become more pronounced and will 
therefore, create very real incentives for both managers and clinicians to expend more of their energies, 
collaboratively, to overcome the deficiencies and limitations of current arrangements for the conduct of 
medical and clinical audit. Yet, since audit is solely concerned with the quality of clinical care, and given 
the continuities and complexities of the social order within hospital institutions, it is unlikely that 
managers will gain any meaningfiil increase in their level of direct contiol over clinical practice. This, 
together with the realisation that patient and purchaser satisfaction is dependent upon their overall 
experience with or within the provider organization, provides sufficient grounds for concluding that 
provider unit managers will engineer a deliberate and planned change in emphasis from what has largely 
been a central concern with clinical quality to one that focuses the efforts of all members of the 
organization on the concepts of 'total quality' and 'continuous improvement'. 
CHAPTER E I G H T 
T H E APPLICATION OF TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN 
H E A L T H C A R E PROVIDER UNITS 
The origin, theory and methods of the Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy have already been set 
out and discussed in Chapter Three. However, the application of TQM in UK health care is a relatively 
recent and limited development that has, on the basis of available evidence, largely failed (0vretveit, 
1994). Ovretveit cites four main reasons for this failure: first, continuing change caused by centialized 
political control over the NHS; second, the lack of investment in quality management; third, tiie complex 
mixture of internal and external customers; and fourth, the internal political natiire of the NHS. In 
response however, it can be argued that: first, almost all developed societies are experiencing government 
intervention in healtii care, largely because of increasing costs; second, a cential TQM argument, espoused 
by Crosby (1979), is that 'quality is free', that is, that the investment required to effect quality 
management is substantially less than the costs of poor quality and will thus, be cost-effective; third, a 
cential tenet of TQM is its explicit emphasis on improving the quality of service to both internal and 
external clients; and fourth, market competition in the NHS is likely to become more centially focused on 
quality rather than cost (see Chapter 7, p. 94, above) and thus, all health care professionals will be 
provided with the incentive to integrate internal social and technical processes in pursuit of quality 
improvement. Nevertheless, Ovretveit {Ibid.) acknowledges that two other reasons can account for the 
failure of TQM in the NHS. First, there is a general lack of understanding of both the concept of TQM 
and the technical instruments associated with its cential objective, viz. Continuous Quality Improvement 
(CQI). However, it can be demonsfrated that, while CQI is central to any meaningful quality 
improvement programme, TQM, as a philosophy, has littie to do with quality and much to do witii 
management. The second constraining factor is related to the above mentioned lack of technical 
awareness insofar as provider organizations have attempted to substitute external forms of standard setting 
and review, such as, for example, accreditation to one or otiier of the various industiial models that are 
available through the British Standards Institiite or die International Standards Organization. Again, tiie 
limitations of these forms of what are effectively 'quality assurance' programmes, as opposed to quality 
improvement systems, have already been discussed and have been thus acknowledged by the King's Fund 
Institute (see Chapter 3, p.26, above) which conducts 'Organizational Audit' on behalf of healtii care 
organizations in the UK. 
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In short, because of the limitations of both the application and success of quality initiatives in the 
NHS, the remainder of this paper will focus on the distinct features of TQM in health care by drawing on 
both the literature regarding the fate of TQM initiatives in the UK, the United States, where they have had 
greater exposure within health care provider organizations, and on experience of TQM implementation in 
US styled hospitals in the Middle East. While it is acknowledged that the socio-cultural and political 
environments of this latter setting are largely in-comparable with those of the NHS, a literary review of the 
US experience may be less so. However, the intention is to focus on social and technical issues that could 
be applied or be relevant to any health care setting. Nonetheless, where there are opportunities for 
meaningfiil comparisons to be made, then they will be included. For example, such a comparison is 
possible in terms of changes involving the general shift from direct resource allocation by govermnents 
towards a more indirect, though heavily regulated, form of contract negotiation and competition. 
Similarly, within this new context, developments such as organizational restructuring and the application 
of new technology that facilitate improved investigative procedures, for example. Computerized 
Tomography (CT) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), have, respectively, resulted in greater 
efficiency and higher standards of medical care. Nevertheless, the costs associated witii technological 
developments, and the emergence of distinct agencies. Health Maintenance Organizations in the US for 
example, which have explicit third party responsibility for the purchase of health care, have combined to 
mount a formidable challenge to what has largely been a provider based monopoly over the question of 
health care quality. These changes, together with increased patient awareness of variations in qualitj' 
standards, have created an urgent need for provider organizations to develop patient-centered total quality 
improvement environments within which their staff can begin to respond to social, economic and political 
demands for more care, better care and cost-effective care. 
It is also relevant to note that the combined failure of external, internal and professional 
regulation, togetiier with new forms of funding, to sigmficantly improve tlie quality of health care is not 
unique to the UK experience. The US experience of similar approaches have shown that neither cost-and-
volume contracts, professional review organizations (PROs), nor external accreditation have resulted in 
effective solutions for improving the quality of "...internal systems [and] processes" witiiin provider 
organizations (Milakovich, 1991, p. 10). Indeed, "...cooperative opposition or passive resistance from 
primary care givers" (Milakovich, Ibid.) was a common outcome, and is similar in some respects to the 
lack of clinical involvement in TQM initiatives in the UK (Joss et. al., 1994). 
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Health care quality is often considered to be the preserve of the clinical professions because the 
'clinical intervention' is usually regarded as the most important determinant of quality (Normand et. al., 
undated). However, the complete and sustained involvement of all members of a provider organization is 
the cornerstone of any TQM initiative. Yet, in the NHS and elsewhere, when strategic business plans 
have been produced for service delivery and development, the issue of quality is often addressed in 
eloquent unit, directorate or departmental mission statements which 'speak', for example, of the 
"...hohstic nature of patient care...the need for empathy with relatives and friends... . [and] how the patient 
is the epicentre of all activity" when the reality is staff who are "...as frosty as the day and the mood on the 
ward [is] one of misery" (Henry, 1994, p. 35). Henry's testimony is of course, anecdotal and may 
represent both an extreme and minority type of experience. Nevertheless, it does illustrate a common 
problem with many provider approaches to TQM insofar as, although they may present their vision of the 
concept adequately on paper, its practical manifestation is either inadequate or non-existent - perhaps 
because the primary purpose of the 'business plan' is to ensure continuity of income and provide a basis 
for the development of the 'business cases' that must be produced in support of bids for capital 
developments (Moriarty, 1994). 
Yet, there is considerable evidence from health related TQM case studies in the US (see. Main, 
1994, Ch. 11, for example), and agreement elsewhere, to support the assertion that, if TQM is to mean 
anything at all in practice, then it must become the central organizing concept of a strategic mission that is 
shaped and shared by all members of the organization who will thus, both individually and collectively, 
accept responsibility for its implementation (Milakovich, Op. cit., p. 10; Harrington, 1995, p. 91; JCAHO, 
1991, p. 24; see also. Manning, 1994, pp. 24-26, for a brief, but salient discussion on the need to 'redefine 
the purpose and function of health care organizations). This latter assertion is not unknown to most 
health care organizations however, but, given the constraints of their overtly political external 
enviromnents and the complexities of their internal social and technical systems, the crucial problem that 
they face is that of how to gain, and sustain, the necessary commitment of their staJff. Two approaches 
will thus be used to provide some practical suggestions for overcoming this problem. First, the solutions 
espoused by mainstream 'quality gurus' will be examined and discussed. Second, the results of structured 
observation exercises, that were conducted within provider units and reveal some of the relevant concerns 
and views of staff will be presented and their implications discussed in terms of identifying the strengths 
and weakness of the application of mainstream solutions to the world of health care. 
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Although the abundance of mainstream paradigms that have been used in industry' to facilitate the 
implementation of TQM rarely share a common terminology, which is perhaps one of their major 
weaknesses, they do generally share a common vision of the major philosophical, social and technical 
changes that must be assimilated, effected and applied if the 'search for excellence' (Peters and Waterman, 
1982) is to be successful. In philosophical terms, the single most significant factor concerns the 
requirement for a shift in organizational focus from profits to people, and on this basis, for continuous 
improvement through a change in emphasis on individual performance to processes performance, and on 
collective rather than individual responsibility. Within the social context of such paradigms, the issues of 
leadership, management style and organizational structure are of central importance while, in technical 
terms, the application of measurement techniques is considered, fundamentally, to underpin all other 
efforts. 
On one hand, the change in emphasis from profits to people represents a strategic response to, 
and an acknowledgment of, the failure of regulatory and cost-containment policies to achieve desired 
improvements in productivity, particularly in service industries (Scherkenbach, 1986). Similarly, the 
combined orientation towards a concern with process and collective performance can be considered to 
represent an operational strategy that finally, and conclusively, recognizes the contemporary inadequacies 
of scientific management. The resultant cohesion that can be effected by re-aligning the control 
relationship between employees and their work-related processes is designed to bring 'hands on' expertise 
to operational problem solving and, though the most successful use of this strategy has been in 
manufacturing industry, it often results in mutual benefits to the individual in, terms of job satisfaction, 
and to the organization in terms of greater output capacity, reductions in the 'down time' of equipment, 
reduced 'product failure' and a correlative improvement in customer satisfaction. Nevertheless, such 
transformations in organizational vision are fundamentally dependent on changes in management stj'le 
and structure, and both of these are unlikely to occur without a dynamic and specific form of leadership. 
Such leadership is characterized by the willingness to learn about qualit>', about the central importance of 
the 'customer' and that there are multiple internal and external customer interfaces within most 
organizations. Yet, as Main (1994, Op. cit., p. 263) has illustrated, it is usually the most senior members 
of an organization who display the greatest reluctance to absorb and apply TQM Concepts. 
(1) Based on the findings of a case-study into the results of a TQM initiative at the Barley Davidson 
Motorcycle Company, presented by Tom Peters during a televised presentation. 
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TQM thus presents the leaders of organizations with a fundamental personal challenge, for if they 
carmot be persuaded to extol the virtues of the concept in every aspect of their work, and be seen to do so, 
then both their individual credibility and that of the TQM initiative will soon be discredited. In short, if 
they are to effect the necessary transformations and changes in management style and organizational 
structure, then leaders must be seen, as one American colleague put it, to 'walk the talk'. 
There is on the other hand, little that is new about the type of change that TQM implies for styles 
of management or organizational structures. Since, as outlined above, the concept of TQM is intrinsically 
concerned with changes in attitudes, values, perhaps beliefs, and certainly in organizational practices and 
procedures, it can be considered, and indeed usually is, essentially de-stabilizing in character. Thus, as 
Bums and Stalker (1961) have previously argued, an organic rather than mechanistic structure provides 
the most suitable form of organization, but is one that constrains a participative style of management, 
rather than the top down bureaucratic style that is commonly practiced in many organizational settings. 
In sum, to gain employee commitment to the TQM concept, both the literature and the 
experiences of those who have traveled the TQM route suggest: first, the development of a corporate 
vision, and strategy for its implementation, that sets out the organization's purpose, clearly states its 
values and beliefs about both customers and employees, and, crucially, involves its employees in the 
development of such statements; second, that leaders must do so by example; and third, that management 
must delegate responsibility, and devolve authority to the lowest possible levels in order to provide their 
employees with a personal stake in the enterprise and to empower them to make 'front line' changes in 
working practices and procedures that will result in their greater contribution to the overall well-being of 
the organization and that of its customers or clients. However, effecting such change demands substantial 
financial investment in education and training, especially in quality management methods such as 
teamwork for example, and in the principles of measurement that are necessary to determine, monitor and 
improve process performance where possible or desirable. Moreover, in order to sustain commitment to 
quality management, and to maintain the 'learning culture' of the organization, continual investment will 
be required. Finally, all of these activities will require a similarly substantial investment in time since it 
is commonly believed that successful TQM implementation takes up to ten, but not usually less than five 
years - depending upon the complexity of existing organizational arrangements. What then, are the 
prospects for TQM in health care? 
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On the basis of the above discussion, and on that contained in the previous Chapter, some general 
observations can made about TQM in health care provider units. First, there will need to be a greater 
level of 'ownership' of the corporate vision among middle-grade managers, doctors, nurses and other 
'front-line' staff if the philosophies, values, beliefs and objectives of organizational business plans are to 
be achieved. The people who do the majority of the work also use, and thus control, the mass of available 
resources; but they are also centrally, and crucially, involved in direct interaction with the organization's 
'primary customer', the patient. Although a clear sense of organizational direction must be established, 
the most important 'vision' will be that which is held by those who use or purchase the service. But, 
since this latter 'vision' is essentially conveyed through those people with whom the user most frequently 
interacts, it follows that it is the actions and attitude of the employee, rather than those of the CEO, which 
will ultimately determine how the organization is perceived in actualify. Moreover, the greater the 
number who share the corporate identity espoused by the board, the less there is potential for unintended 
subversion. In short, the first step on the road towards TQM is to ensure that evetyone is walking in the 
same direcfion. Nevertheless, the route towards TQM in health care is likely to be littered with obstacles 
that are not found in other types of industry. For example, the increasingly bureaucratic form of 
centralized accountability that currently afflicts, or is planned to afflict the NHS will not easily be replaced 
by paradigmatic exhortations preached from the pulpit of private enterprise management consultancies. 
Control over health care in the UK is not merely about cost-effective and efficient use of the public purse, 
but has developed into a polifico-ideological battle, between the somewhat ideologically confused anti-
interventionists of the right and the reluctant coUectivists of the centre, that is likely to confinue at least 
until the electorate are given their next opportunity to comment on the future of one of their most revered 
institutions. Hence, whether in the name of TQM, or for any other reason, NHS provider unit managers, 
and possibly their purchaser counterparts, are unlikely to be able, in the short term, to significantiy alter 
the formal structure of their occupational world. However, it is a world that is distinctiy different from 
the conventional world of the quality guru. It contains an extraordinarily dynamic mixture of informal 
sub-cultures that are substantially interconnected by a mixture of professional ethics, work-driven 
interdependencies and entrenched tiaditional values that, in combination, may have the capacity to fly in 
the face of contemporary TQM wisdom and provide, nonetheless, a basis for its successful implementation. 
For, in spite of this anti-logic, the scope, indeed the need for some form of TQM in health care is partly 
illustrated in the views of some care-givers that are reproduced in Tables 2-4 overleaf. 
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T A B L E 3: D I A G N O S T I C R E V I E W : T E C H N I C A L S Y S T E M Q U A L I T Y P R O B L E M S : 
T H E I R C A U S E S & E F F E C T S - I D E N T I F I E D BY E M P L O Y E E S 
1 0 2 
I ' t C I I N I C A L SY S T E M 
P R O B L E M S 
L E V E L O L I C O M E 
O\or-bookniu ol dppointineiils Process Uiiaccoplablo wanintj linio> 
Inuoinplotc Dtscliargc Suniniartes Iii<iivi(iual Dclav 111 discharge 
Del;i\ m L-oninmnicdtJon of icsulls lo GP 
Oui of date or inappropriate 
Ciuidclines or Prolocols 
Pr«ccs> Inappropn.ite ircalmcnt 
Ijielleclivc Irealmcnl 
Inofficicnt use ofiL'Soiirccs 
Opporlu!ut> costs 
Missing medical rccoids Process Unacceptable dclas 
Unacccplable risk lo licalih status 
Inefficient co-ordinafioR of inputs 
Loss of data 
Inappiopriali; use ofinNCSlig.itiMj 
procodureb 
Indi\iiliiiil and 
process 
Inefficient use of resources 
Avoidable discomfort 
Non-availability of iiirormation Process Lack of pcfformance f ;^edback 
Pool Loinniuni(.aiions Process and 
Rtsouixcs 
Lacfc of co-ordmatioji and co-operation 
Crcatioti of conflict 
Oul of date lociuiologN Process iind 
Resources 
Limited services 
La(^ of personal a nd professional 
development 
IncoiupL'tc aiul illesiiblo 
documentation 
Individual and 
Process 
Lack of accurate data 
Overuse of resources through re-work 
Delay in ser\-ice provision 
liudequalc rc\ic\\ ofpi i i t l icc Process Lack of information and feedback 
Hidden costs of poor quality 
Lacfc of opportunity'^  for improvement 
Notes: 
(1) As with Table 2 (overleaf, above), from a quality management perspective the 'Outcomes' would be 
perceived as 'Quality Problems', and the 'Problems' considered to be their 'Underlying Cause'. 
(2) By focusing on the potential locus of the problem, some indication can be made about whether the 
problem is 'sporadic' in nature (Individual Level), or 'chronic' in nature (Process Level) - see Chapter 3. 
Nonetheless, measurement of the scale of the problem will usually be necessary to effect a solution. 
(3) Although the above issues were identified as pertaining to the 'technical system', they may be 
influenced by aspects of the management style or structure of the 'social system'. 
(4) The data presented in the Tables in this Chapter were collected at 3 day TQM seminars during 
observations of structured exercises involving provider unit staff who had no prior exposure to the 
concepts of quality management - though these exercises were deliberately designed to occur on the last 
of the three days when it is assumed the subjects had some understanding of such concepts. 
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T A B L E 4; D I A G N O S T I C R E V I E W : 
P R O B L E M S & S O L U T I O N S F O R T Q M I M P L E M E N T A T I O N 
T Q M IMPLEMENTATION 
PROBLEMS 
TQM IMPLEMENTATION 
SOLUTIONS 
Fear of job losses 
Fear of failure 
Lack of management support 
Negative attitudes of colleagues 
TQM not value for money 
Lack of training 
Need to focus on patients basic needs 
Lack of a unified staff structure 
Inappropriate use of working hours 
Budget constraints 
No hospital development plan 
No development plan for TQM 
Maintenance of old rules and regulations 
External influences 
Lack of communication 
No follow up after initial TQM tiaining 
Inconsistent decision making 
Potential loss of control 
No open door management policy 
Empower staff to make changes 
Ask staff where to make changes 
Management must demonsfrate commitinent 
Education and training 
Cut the costs of poor quality 
Provide in house fraining 
Prioritize aims 
Work in teams 
Reallocate staff where needed 
Isn't that the whole point? 
Produce Five Year Service Development Plan 
Put 'quality' at the top of the agenda 
Remove them 
Identify them 
'Walk tiie talk' 
Identify issues 
Involve staff in decisions 
Establish a steering team 
More management visibility 
Notes: 
(1) The group which produced the above data was comprised of six teams of eight participants. Each 
group included members of the following professions: Nursing (7), Medicine and Dentistry (24), 
Management(l), Maintenance and Engineering(2), and Clinical Support Service Staff (Radiology (J), 
Pathology (3), Pharmacy (2), Physiotherapy (J) and Respiratory Therapy (J). In addition, six 
participants represented Non-Clinical Support Services (Medical Audit (1), Catering (I), Ambulance 
Services (I), Quality Management Services (2) and Housekeeping (I) The data are aggregated from the 
responses of each group and reveal a considerable degree of consensus.. 
(2) Although the group can thus be considered to be reasonably heterogeneous, and again, the exercise 
was conducted on the last day of a 3 day training course, the responses are likely to have been 
substantially influenced precisely because the participants had just been exposed to TQM concepts. 
However, the strong presence of the medical profession is noteworthy, as is the weak representation of 
management 
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It is common in the early phases of any health care quality management initiative, for employees 
to react, to what are essentially unrecognizable propositions, by responding defensively and, though 
unwittingly because of their lack of exposure to method and measurement, sometimes inaccurately to 
questions about the quality of care or standards of service. This is, to some extent, illustrated in Table 2 
(above, overleaf) where a quality management analysis of the same issues would lead to rather different 
conclusions than those drawn by respondents. For example, the small number of quality 'problems and 
causes' perceived to be located within the 'social and technical systems' can be considered rather, as the 
'immediate causes' of the many 'outcome' issues (problems) illustrated in column four. In a textual form 
the argument is thus: 
'...the lack of education and training, difficulties in recruitment and the shortage of 
funds that constrain a low level of investment, are responsible for the shortage of skills 
that cause employee stress due to the inappropriate use of their skills that results in low 
morale, a lack of motivation, poor attendance, inter-staff conflict, yet implies that it is 
the attitude and quality of our staff that is the problem when, in fact, this is clearly not 
the case' 
This indulgence into what can might be regarded as an element of poetic hcence is not however, 
intended to mock or alter the testimony of the respondents, but to illustrate the often complex and 
sometimes hidden relationships between dependent variables that have not, or cannot, be subjected to a 
form of measurement. Measurement is central to the management and improvement of quality, but, the 
value of the exercise outlined in Table 2 is that, had it not been conducted, we would not have known 
where to start measuring in the first place. The involvement of staff in the 'focus' stage (see. Chapter 3, 
p. 36, Figure 8, above) of the continuous improvement process is thus, both necessary and central. A 
similar, though perhaps clearer, argument can be developed on the basis of the data contained in Table 3 
where issues identified as 'outcomes' are in fact, quality problems that might be caused by what are mainly 
process failures. The importance of identifying the locus or nature of a quality problem has been 
discussed above (Chapter 3, pp. 24-25) but, to restate the point, 'sporadic' problems, usually individual or 
functional in nature, and 'chronic' problems, mostly process related, have distinct methodological 
implications for their resolution. Moreover, it is clear, that when employees are brought togetiier to 
address the question of 'poor quality', as distinct from the more usual type of forum that produces 
standards for 'good quality', then the range of issues that are identified and tiie resultant scope for 
improvement is likely to be far in excess of that produced by tiaditional quality assurance. 
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However, perhaps tiie most revealing testimony is that contained in Table 4 (p. 103, above). 
Here, respondents were asked to identify the major constraints and potential solutions for the 
implementation of TQM in a health care provider setting, and, in doing so have illustiated one major 
difficulty that they did not actually identify, viz, that all of the potential barriers that were identified have 
something to do with someone else! Although this 'defensive' stance is common, for reasons already 
outlined, it represents a considerable hurdle in large organizations such as hospitals since there will likely 
be a pervasive 'wait and see what someone else does' attitude before individual employees will commit 
themselves in earnest to a new and largely unproved form of activity. In short, if nothing else, this subUe 
revelation reinforces the need for clear, decisive, consistent and unwavering leadership on the part of 
senior management. Moreover, Table 4 also illustrates an element of simplicity attached to the TQM 
concept since the suggested solutions to many implementation problems are merely the antithesis of the 
problem itself. Yet, such simplicities may be rare in the health care arena where the TQM concept 
probably does require a major 'paradigm shift' (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 1990, p. 7) in terms of the way 
that the health care professions both think about and conduct their work. The explicitiy participative sfyle 
of TQM contrasts sharply with the long tradition of professional authority and autonomy enjoyed by 
doctors, and the concept of empowerment must sit uneasily on the shoulders of those who have only 
recentiy been given greater contiol over administiative issues. Hence, managers too, will need to work 
hard to overcome the organizational and operational contradictions witii which they are confronted. 
In sum, in an 'industry' where the safety of the 'customer' and of the 'customers purse' are 
largely regulated by statute, the management of quality in health care will, for the time being, depend 
upon the continuation of a three dimensional stiategy which includes professional self-regulation and 
professional audit together with a determined and sustained effort to harness the efforts of the considerable 
human potential that exists within the social organizations of health care provider units. While there are 
many social, economic, political and professional grounds for the development of total quality 
management in health care, it cannot be the same TQM that has been applied with vatying degrees of 
success, and failure, in industry and commerce. It can however, if pursued with integrity, clarity and 
honesty, be adapted and integrated with other initiatives such as Medical Audit for example (see. Chapter 
3, Figure 8, p. 36), to provide those who actually deliver care and services with the methods they require to 
measure, monitor and continually improve the processes within which they are required to work. 
CHAPTER NEVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Eleventh International Congress of the International Society for Quality in Health care, held in 
Venice in May, 1994 was described as a 'nostalgic' occasion (Palmer, 1994), and, in a word, illustrates 
both the problems and the promise for health care quality in the UK. On the one hand, while much of the 
developed World in the Americas, Europe and Australia were learning from their journey through 'quality 
control', 'professional audit', 'accreditation', 'quality assurance' and finally on to 'total qualit>' 
management', we in the UK, having taken the 'quality assurance' concept on board at somewhere around 
1989AD, have quickly abandoned what had never really worked anyway (see Chapter Three), and have, or 
might think we have, finally caught up with the latest in a long hne of fashionable attempts to get more 
out of less for nothing. A contentious condemnation, perhaps, but if we consider the substantial financial 
investment that has been made in Medical Audit to promote something that was already happening 
anyway (see Crombie et al., 1993, in Chapter Two) it may be prudent on the other hand, to capitalize on 
being one of the 'last industiial nations' to jump on the quality management bandwagon and reflect, 
reconsider and try to devise a workable implementation plan rather than attempt to persevere with a 
concept that has simply not worked in the way it was supposed to, and thus, is in need of 'continual 
improvement', albeit, one that will be achieved by the same level of intellect that created it in the first 
place. Consider Peters (1992, quoted in Main, 1994, p. 308) for example: 
TQM is flawed...or so I used to think. Now I think fit is] fatally flawed. Prediction: 
Twenty years from now, when the history is written of the epic transformation of 
American business during the 1980s and 1990s, TQM won't even get a footnote 
(though maybe a couple of laughs). 
Peters is, according to Main (1994, p. Ibid.), attacking the manner in which the TQM concept 
has been executed - "...efforts that are all charts, graphs, meetings, and procedures, with but littie 
empowerment or results" - ratiier than being critical of the concept itself. In many respects tins is 
sufficientiy similar to the findings of this research to provide an authoritative basis for conclusions that 
might be considered by some health care practitioners to be just a littie more than contentious given that 
they are based on something other than the rigorous methods of the positivist approach to which tiiey are 
more accustomed. 
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The findings of the sttidy, with regard to the Medical Audit initiative, will be presented within 
the context of the environmental and socio-technical issues outiined in Chapters Six and Seven 
respectively, and will be discussed in relation to the conceptual design of the audit process tiiat is 
described in Chapter Two. Similarly, the findings in respect of Total Quality Management will be 
presented within the context of the assessment contained in Chapter Eight, and with due regard to relevant 
aspects of the environmental and socio-technical issues outiined in Chapters Six and Seven, but will be 
discussed with reference to the conceptual design of TQM which is described in Chapter Three. Finally, 
the limitations of the findings will be discussed in relation to the research methodology which is outiined 
in Chapter Five. 
The systematic review of medical practice that is 'Medical Audit' is both a necessary and 
increasingly important activity that has proved to be technically successfiil in improving the quality of 
medical care. Such successes, the result of both national and local audit studies, are regularly published 
in the appropriate journals or as publicly available reports, and there mere existence provides one 
indication that audit is a necessary activity and is recognized as such by all of the Royal Colleges who 
continue to support and promote the audit concept (see for example, Hopkins, 1994, Section 2 especially). 
In addition, the importance of audit, from a provider perspective, is implied by the growing maturity and 
influence of the health authorities who, in forging links with other purchasing organizations, will have 
greater financial potential to exert pressure for demonstrable improvements in provider performance (see 
Chapter Six). Such pressure may, for example, result from the economic logic of contiactual negotiations 
that establish a lower unit cost per case in return for larger service contiacts that effect a greater level of 
throughput. The review of medical practice will be thus become vital to ensure, if nothing else, that 
socially, professionally and contractually acceptable standards are maintained. Indeed, the forthcoming 
allocation of audit related funding to purchasers, for distribution through the contiactual process is likely 
to provide the audit process with a clearer sense of direction by virtue of what might become a mandatory 
requirement to focus on specific issues. Similarly, the likely managerial confrol over such funds, given 
their contractual integration with other income, may also provide a basis for a more central role for 
managers in the audit process. In sum, both the process of medical audit and the results of audit activity 
are likely to come under a larger microscope than has hitherto been the case. Yet, in both senses, it may 
be found wanting. This conclusion is constrained as much by the evidence that is not available, or is 
inconclusive, as it is revealed through an examination of the socio-technical systems within provider units. 
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On the one hand, Buxton (1994, p. 33) has argued that, the "...skills and commitment" that are 
necessary to substantiate the 'systematic' criterion contained in the audit definition (Chapter Two, p. 14, 
above) are simply not available. This claim is partly underpinned by Hopkins (1994, p. 118) who reveals 
that "Many consultants" are not over enthusiastic about either the audit process or the methods used to 
conduct audit review. Buxton {Ibid., pp. 31-34) supports his arguments on the grounds of the technical 
inadequacy of Uie audit process with reference to 'inadequate sampling', questionable standards, the lack 
of 'research underpinning' and of 'scientific audit'. However, it is not clear whether he is confusing audit 
with research, suggesting that audit ought oidy to be conducted on the basis of recent research, ought to 
become a research activity, is merely limited by the absence of social 'scientific' (sampling) skills, or is 
inadequately based on 'local' standards that are derived from local experience of the application of 
existing knowledge on a particular population. Buxton may of course, be suggesting all of these, but 
might be challenged on the latter on epidemiological grounds, and on the basis of the argument, outiined 
in Chapter Two, about the distinction between audit and research. Conversely, he can be supported in 
general terms, as can Hopkins (Op. cit.), who bases his findings on the results of survey research, in the 
sense that it is the conceptual adequacy of the audit initiative that can be criticized for its substantial 
failure to create a greater impact - a failure that has much to do with provider unit social and technical 
systems rather than the technical adequacy of audit methods. Three issues support this conclusion. First, 
the nature of the work, and the historical development of audit may have constiained different levels of 
participation and effectiveness of discipline specific audit programmes. Surgery, radiolog>' and obstetrics 
for example, gain fiom the long history of audit with which they are associated (Chapter Two, p. 15), 
surgery also, from the association of 'measurement' with the precision of cutting and sawing, radiolog)' 
from its inherently investigative and thus, by implication, inquisitive nature, and obstetrics from the 
technological advances, such as ultrasound, that have facilitated a large degree of precision and prediction 
in child birth. Pathology has also gained from the automation of much of its work and the related 
development of a system of Quality Controls used to measure the upper and lower control limits of 
calibration settings for instruments. These measures are plotted daily, on run charts that can be accessed 
by any member of staff to determine degrees of confidence in the results of tests, variation is identifiable 
prospectively and 'sporadic' problems thus addressed with sufficient speed to maintain a high level of 
performance. Conversely, more artistic disciplines, such as internal medicine, or the somewhat subjective 
world of psychiatry for example, have greater difficulty in applying measurement techniques to their work 
and thus, variation in audit activity or its impact is almost inevitable. 
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Second, social relations in health care also impact on the technical system, and on the audit 
process. In respiratory medicine for example, much of the medical work involves interaction not with 
other doctors, but with respiratory or physiotherapists - professional colleagues perhaps, but not 
professional members - and, in what is effectively a sub-specialty of internal medicine, since "...most 
people are converted [to audit] by tiieir colleagues" (Stocking, 1994, in Hopkins, Op. Cit., p. 135), such 
single handed 'specialists' will have less opportunity to interact, locally, with similarly qualified 
colleagues and will thus, be less susceptible to 'conversion'. However, there are other adverse 'social 
system' influences on the conduct of audit, of which the question of ethics is, though perhaps the least 
visible, is one of the most profound. For example, it is not possible, for practical reasons, for a Clinical 
Director, say a specialist in gastroenterology, to influence the specialist practice of one of his 'managed' 
physicians, say a cardiologist, indeed, the former will often require and must accept the clinical advice of 
the latter if cross-specialty referral is required. Yet, if it were possible for such influence to be exerted in 
practical terms, it is prohibited on ethical grounds (see Chapter Seven). Thus, all than can be achieved in 
a formal sense, regardless of the adoption of directorate structures, is that a doctor be directed to conduct 
audit review, but his or her apphcation, commitment and output is largely a personal matter. 
Finally, the local internal environment of a provider unit may, or may not, have been equipped 
with either or both a Resource Management information base and medical audit information s}'stem. 
However, where such systems are distinct, then ownership is also commonly distinct with the medical staff 
controlling the latter and management the former. At directorate level, this lack of systems integration 
can result in the medical secretary working within an audit system, inputting data and producing 
automated, and thus improved, discharge summaries, while the divisional manager and his or her 
secretary use different computer hardware and software to access the resource database and update the 
financial status of the directorate. In short, the contradiction caused by the poorly planned or incomplete 
development of information technology (see Chapter Six, including figure 14) is that while data pertaining 
to clinical practice is entered into one system, there is no integrated link with cost-related activity data in 
the other. Some units will on the other hand, have developed fully or partially integrated systems, but 
this will inevitably result in, and to some extent explains, inter-unit variation in audit activity. In 
addition, such variations may be exacerbated if audit funds are more unevenly distributed through the 
contiact system, though, if anything, this possibility should spur both managers and clinicians to greater 
efforts to improve a process that has been found to be somewhat conceptually inadequate. 
110 
Total Quality Management is less well developed than professional audit in UK health care, but 
may, if implemented in the form of the industrial TQM model, prove to represent a pohcy variant of the 
common 'imrecoverable application error' generated within computer systems. Again, though with 
different emphases, the reasons can be found within the socio-technical and environmental contexts of 
health care provider units. On the one hand, the industrial model of TQM clearly demands both an 
organic organizational structure and highly devolved style of management (see Chapter Eight). Yet, the 
complexities of the purchaser-provider relationship, together with continuing uncertainty about the 'what' 
and 'when' of the next stage of an almost continuous period of change, have substantially filled the 
managerial agenda to the exclusion of many other important operational issues. Moreover, as Figure 15, 
Chapter Six, p. 77, above) illusfrates, neither the operational sphere of influence nor the realistic span of 
control of tiie general manager are conducive to the application of tiie type of leadership role that tiiey 
would be deemed to assume within the industrial model. 
In addition, the almost complete erosion of democratic accountability has forced NHS managers 
to publicly restate the integrity of their role at the interface between a powerful external environment and a 
complex local arena adding to the multiplicity of formal relationships of new relationships, responsibilities 
and accountabilities that have resulted from a complex, contiadictory and potentially hostile environment 
within which the contemporary provider unit manager must mediate the resultant conflicts of interests 
between the state, the hospital, the employee and the patient. TQM might however, represent the greatest 
potential for conflict, at a time when it would clearly not be advisable, since it challenges the very basis of 
professional autonomy and fraditional autiiority that is held so dear by the medical, and perhaps otiier 
professions, and is underpinned by the persistency of the ethic of confidentiality. 
Furthermore, a major implication of the continual quality improvement (CQI) process that is so 
cenfral to TQM is tire need to collect relevant and timely data, as close as possible to the source that 
generates it, to reduce the potential for error. Yet, given the sheer volume of activity that occurs within a 
hospital setting, the availability of an integrated Management Information System is tiius a practical 
precondition for meaningfiil CQI, but, for reasons outiined above, is unlikely to be forthcoming, at least in 
the short term since, like audit, funding will need to be extracted from the total value of contiacts placed 
with purchasers who may, or may not, be inclined, or be able, to promote such developments and will 
likely prioritize on, and persevere with the less costly manual process of peer review. 
I l l 
Finally, representatives of the primary 'customer', the patient, are unlikely to demonstiate any 
substantial support for what is a relatively untried and untested, but potentially costly programme. In the 
survey previously referred to above, it was revealed that only 2 per cent of LMACs reported that they had 
arranged to conduct audits on behalf of their local Community Health Councils (CHCs). Similarly, only 
eight CHC members were reported be members of one or otiier of the 187 LMACs who responded to the 
survey (Hopkins, Op. cit.). Though this may be substantially due to shortcomings in communications 
regarding the conduct and effectiveness of medical audit, it may impact on the perceived credibility of 
other quality initiatives. In short, there is likely to be littie external demand for a concept that is littie 
understood. Nor, given that the internal re-organization of provider imits has, in some respects, 
sfrengthened the medical voice, will there likely be much internal enthusiasm for TQM in the format 
designed by private enterprise. In spite of the greater managerial role of some consultant medical staff, 
the continuities of the established social order, and the planned extension of professional self-regulation 
(see Chapter Seven, especially CMC, 1992), represent considerable constiaints for further, self inflicted, 
change. Nevertheless, as the overview of the TQM concept in Chapter Three (Figure 6) illustiates, there 
is a need, ff meaningful improvement is to be made in healtii care delivety, for a change in orientation 
from functional to process based management. Since the outcome would, or should result in better care 
and increased patient and staff satisfaction, then it is perhaps, to the professions that the TQM concept 
should be addressed for pre-implementation modification to ensure that when the stage for take-off is 
eventually reached, total means everyone, management means devolved responsibility and authority, and 
'quality' is transformed into demonstrable continuous improvement. Small scale trials can be conducted 
within cohesive units such as the clinical laboratoty for example, where both the internal structtu-e, the 
availability of relevant skills and the nature of the work, in brief, the social and technical systems, are 
reasonably compatible with quality management (see Chapter Three, Figure 9, p. 37). In its current form 
however, TQM, like audit, is also conceptually inadequate, though perhaps not internally, but in the sense 
that it simply cannot be effected within the current socio-technical systems and environmental settings 
that are entrenched within health care provider units. Medical audit can also be integrated (see Chapter 
Three, Figure 8, p. 36) as can risk management and external accreditation, all have some role to play in 
an environment where the safety of the customer is, fortunately, regulated as much as the 'customers 
purse' - but, rather like golf, the secret of the game will be to determine which one to use, for what 
purpose, and when. Quality is never an accident, it is the result of high intention, sincerity, integrity, 
and, above all, effort - and, it takes time. 
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The methodological limitations of these findings must however, be briefly discussed. On the one 
hand, less attention was given to the successes of audit and other quality management initiatives on the 
grounds that where these have occurred, they are generally available for review. The research focus was 
thus directed to seek out the reasons for the limited impact of quality initiatives, but in doing so will, 
however justifiably, display an element of bias, the difference between what was observable and what was 
observed, against those enthusiastic former and current colleagues who provided, wittingly or otherwise, 
much of the material upon which this thesis is based. Nevertheless, they are, and they know they are, in 
the minority. Thus, if some insight should result from the material thus presented, and further progress 
can be made, both their efforts and those of the author might prove to redress the imbalance 
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